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3RÉSUMÉ
La théorie de Ripeness développée par William Zartman s’avère hautement
pertinente dans l’analyse de l’intervention des multinationales militaires dans les
guerres civiles sévissant en Angola et en Sierra Leone, puisqu’elle met en lumière
la manière dont ces multinationales militaires favorisent et facilitent l’obtention
d’un dénouement diplomatique aux guerres civiles qui s’éternisent. Notre essai
démontre qu’Executive Outcomes (EO), une multinationale militaire sud-africaine,
a contribué à créer des conditions de ripeness dans les deux pays ci-haut
mentionnés, ce qui conduisit les adversaires à la table de négociations suite à des
années d’impasse. EO a fomenté ce que William Zartman dénomme un MutualÏy
Hurting Stalemate (MHS) en nourrissant la symétrie structurelle des guerres à la
fois en Angola et en Sierra Leone. Ceci eut pour résultat la formation de
douloureuses impasses propices à l’inauguration de négociations. Dans les deux
cas, cette conjoncture fut saisie et transformée en négociations, tout en échouant à
établir une paix durable. L’absence de pacification sur le long terme n’infirme en
rien le fait qu’ EO ait contribué à la création de MHSs qui ont jeté les bases de
ripeness. S’il appert que l’implication des multinationales militaires est favorable à
une paix durable, il faut que cela s’intègre dans un cadre politique et diplomatique
plus vaste et plus compréhensible. Les conclusions auxquelles nous a mené ce
mémoire sont significatives, étant donné qu’elles démontrent qu’un acteur privé,
externe à la situation, a eu la capacité de générer une situation de ripeness. A une
époque où la volonté politique internationale est faible et où les états défaillants
échouent fréquenirnent à mobiliser de fortes capacités militaires, l’usage de
services des multinationales militaires se présente comme une option prometteuse.
Mots clés: Angola; Dénouement diplomatique ; Executive Outcomes ; Guerre
civile ; MutuaÏÏy Hurting Statemate ; Multinationale de guerre ; Paix durable
Ripeness; Sierra Leone ; Symétrie structurelle des guerres.
ABSTRACT
This research analyzes the intervention of Private Military Firms (PMFs) in the
intra-state wars of Angola and Sierra Leone. I apply William Zartman’s notion of
ripeness to probe the utility and effectiveness of private defense contractors in
facilitating the negotiated resolution of protracted civil wars. This paper argues that
Executive Outcomes (EO) a South African PMF, helped generate ripeness in both
countries at hand by restoring military symmetry and by contributing to the
creation of Mutually Hurting Stalemates (MHSs) which led the warring parties to
the negotiation table after years of impasse. In both cases, the ripe moments were
seized and turned into negotiations but failed to generate long-term peace. This lack
of sustainable peace does flot negate the fact that EO contributed to the creation of
a MHS which laid the foundations for ripeness. If the involvement of PMFs is to be
conducive to long-term peace, it must probably fali within a wider diplomatie
package. The findings of this thesis are significant since they demonstrate that an
external private actor can generate ripeness. In a time when international political
will is low and failing states possess weak military capabilities, the use of private
military services may be an option worth considering.
Keywords: Angola; Asymmetric Warfare; Civil War; Executive Outcomes;
MutualÏy Hurting Stalemate; Negotiated Outcome; Private MiÏitary Industry;
Ripeness; Sierra Leone; Sustainable Peace.
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8INTRODUCTION
The increasingly manifest presence of private military firms (PMFs) during
the last two decades lias flot gone unnoticed. Tlie contemporary era marked by
lieiglitened and unconventional security tlireats lias incited and spurred tlie dramatic
proliferation of tliese new transnational corporate actors’. Offering a wide
assortment of military and security services, PMFs, by their slieer existence,
directly confront standard traditional beliefs concerning security issues, namely tlie
exclusive control of nation states in the sphere of defense2.
Tlie unique nature and the relatively new occurrence of tlie private miÏitary
industry sliaped with a business-like ftamework have somewhat cauglit
policymakers and scliolars alike off guard. Tlieories of international relations have
traditionally attributed overwlielming attention to tlie sovereign nation state. The
realist school of tliought establishes tlie sovereign state as the central and key player
in international relations, despite apparent systemic transformations resulting from
tlie contemporary phenomenon of globalization. Althougli it is not incorrect to
pronounce states as the ultimate players in international affairs, their supremacy
within the international system lias declined relative to otlier actors such as non
govemmental organizations, international organizations, multinational
organizations and transnational organizations3.
More specifically in tlie realm of security studies thougli, not only are there
new non-governmental threats to international stability, but tliere are also new
potential non-govemmental providers of international stability. PMFs, by means of
military and strategic capabilities, are one sucli actor. Following a rationalist scliool
of tliought and a dominant state-centric paradigm, PMFs can merely be construed as
David Shearer, Private Arinies and Militai-y Interventions (Adeiphi Paper 3 19,
Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 23.
2 Herbert M. Howe, “Private Security Forces and African Stability: the case of Executive
Outcomes”, Tue Journal ofModern African Studies 36 (no. 2) (1998), 308.
Diane Ethier, with the collaboration of Marie-Jolle Zahar, Introduction aux relations
Internationales (2 cd., Montra1: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 2004), 3 1-54.
9instruments employed by states to maximize their national interests4. Scholars such
as Deborali Avant have stated that contrary to the misconception of PMFs
undermining state power, “miÏitary contractors can actually enhance the power of
individual states, as wlien failed states like Sierra Leone essentially buy an army”5.
This thesis shah attempt to partiahÏy fui a theoretical void within the
literature pertaining to the private military industry by seeldng to understand in a
more comprehensive manner the nature of PMF activity. More specifically, this
study shah seek to uncover whether or flot PMFs contribute to the resolution of civil
wars within weak and failing states, especially in the case of two particular civil
wars liaving taken place in Angola and Sierra Leone. In order to examine the
relationship between PMFs and conflict resolution, we shah test one hypothesis:
PMFs do indeed contribute to conftict resolution by creating ripeness6 for political
negotiations to take place. In order to test this hypothesis which will serve to assess
the impact of PMfs on conflict resolution, the war weariness theory particularly
expounded by William Zartman will serve as the main theoretical framework7.
Therefore, this study’s aim is to expose the effects that PMFs have on the process of
civil war resolution in the case of two particular intra-state wars.
Research Topic
The complex, ambiguous and often heterogeneous character of PMFs lias
been a source of confusion and contention amongst scholars. Putting semantics
aside however8, most would agree that PMFs are corporate actors supplying
mihitary related services to recognized national governments, corporate firms and
non-govemmental organizations (etc.). From a purely pragmatic realist perspective,
the private military industry, when employed in the context of civil wars, could be
“Herbert M. Howe, “Private Security forces and African Stability: the case ofExecutive
Outcomes”, 308.
Deborah D. Avant, 2004. “Think Again: Mercenaries”, Foreign Policy (JuIy/August).
6 This concept will be ftirther elaborated on in Chapter Two Ripeness Theoiy.
I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985/1989).
8 These private entities can be referred to as Private Military firms, Private Military Companies,
Private Security Companies (etc.). Refer notably to: Daniel Bergner, “The Other Army”,
The New York Tiines Magazine (New York), August 14, 2005 Section 6, 29-35.
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considered as a convenient instrument used by states to maximize their national
interests in the face of an internai threat. Due in part to their proficient, resourceful
and suppie manner of conducting business, transnational corporate actors
specialized in the supply of military services are capable of offering weak and
failing states, whom seldom have any other feasible alternative, a viable solution to
an immediate and rapidly escalating threat. Although outsourcing PMFs is a
possible way out for these particular clients, what is less clear is how promising this
alternative will prove to be in the long mn.
Clients of combat oriented PMFs9 tend to be weak national governments
with comparatively low military capabilities facing immediate, high threat
situations10. Failing to exert effective control over the territory they govem and
unable of even providing security to their own citizens, governments within failing
and weak states are often incapable of maintaining or restoring internal stability.
Whist these govemments face internai menaces which threaten their very
governance, they often must turn to external third parties for assistance. While
superpowers filled this need during the Cold War, this is no longer a realistic
prospect since the end of the Cold War, especially in Africa where certain nations
have lost much of their strategic importance”. No longer governed by the logic and
rules enshrined in a bipolar system, many weak and failing states within Africa can
no longer confidently depend on external involvement for assistance. A number of
these states have tumed to PMFs for assistance. Essentially, the private military
industry’s “purpose is to enhance the capabiiity of a client’s military forces to
function better in a war”2.
PMFs: Defining the Object ofResearch
This is especially true of military provider firms introduced in the next two pages.
‘° Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrior, The Rise ofthe Privatized Militaiy Industiy (New York:
Corneli University Press, 2003), 93.
It must however be mentioned that although the US, Russia and the UN have been less willing to
intervene in certain African states following the end of the Cold War (subsequent to the
power and security vacuum that emerged), they have remained central players in other
areas such as the Middle East, the Baikans and Chechnya.
12 David Shearer, Private Armies and Mititaiy Interventions, 23.
y’
In order to properly conduct further analytical researcli on the private
military industry, an adequate understanding of the nature, function, scope. and
form of PMFs is botli essential and imperative. Peter Singer undoubtedly puts
forward one of the clearest, most concise, parsimonious and functional account of
PMFs’3. Ahhough he recognizes the heterogeneous and multifaceted cliaracter and
the dual nature, that is military and economic (profit driven)’t, of the piivate
military industry, lie points to one single overarching factor which unifies the
industry as a whole: “ail the firms within it offer services that fail within the
military domain”15. In spite of this unifying element, it should nevertlieless be
mentioned that “there are, as yet, no common definitions, standards and
methodologies that can be used to delineate the boundaries of the phenomenon
being discussed”6. Peter Singer points to the fact that:
there are no universally accepted definitions of even the most wideÏy
used terms; no framework of analysis of the industry exists, no
elucidation of the variation in the private military firm’s activities and
impact, no attempts at examining the industry as a whole, and no
comparative analyses17
The conceptual ambiguity surrounding the issue of the private military industry is
of course a potential problem for analysis. The apparent lack of consensus amongst
scholars, even when referring to basic terminology, represents a serious setback for
researcli. This inhibits a fully comprehensive development of explanatory and
predictive concepts.
Nonetheless, we shah borrow from Peter Singer’s work and use bis Tip-of
the-Spear typology, which emerges as the most comprehensive classification due in
3 Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrior, The Risc ofthe Privatfted Milita, ]ndustiy.
11 The profit driven nature of PMFs will be addressed further on in ibis chapter when referring to
Singer’s Tip-of-the-Spear typology and in the following chapters.
‘ Peter Wauen Singer, Corporate Warrioi; The Rise ofthe Privati:ed Militaiy Industrv, 88.
16 Jaklde Cilliers and Richard Cornwell. “Chapter 11: From the Privatization of Security to the
Privatisation ofWar?” in Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatization ofSecttritv in War
Tom African Societies. eds. Jakide Cilliers and Peggy Mason. Johannesburg: Institute for
Security Studies. 1999, 241 as cited in Robert Mande!, Annies without States The
Privatization of Securitv (BoulderlLondon: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 127-128.
‘ Doug Brooks and Hussein Solomon, “From the Editor’s Desk”, Confliet T,-ends 6 (JuIy 2000) as
cited in Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrioi; The Rise of rhe Privatized Militarv
]ndustiy (New York: Corneli University Press,2003), viii.
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part to its recognition of the private military industry’ s dual nature: miiitary and
economic. Among the three broad categories enumerated in Peter Singer’s tip-of
the-spear typoiogy, this research paper shah exclusively focus on type 1 military
pro vider firms (versus miiitary consttïtant and military support firms), which are
distinctively positioned in one specific physical location on a theatre of combat.
What is particularly interesting to us about type 1 firms is that within this theatre of
war, these military pro viders firms directly work and maneuver in the Theater of
Operation (explicitiy the tactical battlefieid), considered to be the very tip of the
spear’8.
According to Peter Singer, type 1 firms focus on the tactical environment. In
a “military sense, such firms provide services at the forefront of the battie-space, by
engaging in actual fighting, either as une units or speciaiists and/or direct command
and control of field units”9. In many cases, they are utilized as force muttiptiers,
with their employees “distributed across the forces of the client, in order to provide
generai leadership and experience to n greater number of individual units”20. As
often is the case with weak and failing states facing immediate internai threats, the
outsourcing of PMFs is often donc under the form of force multipliers. Although
PMFs are capable of putting forward overall unit packages (stand-alone tacticai
military units), they are most reguiariy contracted out as specialized Force
Muitiphiers, which need flot be numerous. Several cases such as those of Angola
and Sierra Leone witnessed the presence of as iittle as 50 civilian contractors on the
terrain. Force muitipiiers:
piay active roies aiongside those of the client, but in a way designed
to make the overahi combination more effective {. . .1 typicaily, their
employees provide either specialized capabiiities too-cost prohibitive
for the local force to develop on its own (such as flying advanced
fighter jets or operating artiliery controi systems), or they may be
distributed across the forces of the client, in order to provide general
leadership and experience to a greater number of individuai units21.
18 Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrior, The Rise ofthe Privatized Mulitaiy Inditstiy, 92.
Ibid., 92.
20 Ibid., 94.
21 Ibid., 94.
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Therefore, the effectiveness of force multipliers is not found in their numbers, but
rather in their specialized tactical role and presence on the terrain.
Although type 1 firms will be the focal point of this analysis, a more
attentive look at the case studies of Angola and Sierra Leone will demonstrate quite
clearly that the type 1 firms22 employed in both cases often also provided services
and functions proper to type 223 and 3 firms24. Therefore, one should bear in mmd
that there is a significant amount of overlap within the three broad categories of
Peter Singer’s typology. Despite this overlap, this research shah nonetheless
emphasize the characteristics proper to type 1 firms which were employed in
Angola and Sierra Leone, since they reveal and expose the actual direct physical
presence of civilian contractors on the battie field, alongside local forces. Hence,
this research paper shall attempt to demonstrate that these firms have the capacity to
directly change the tide of military operations via their local strategic and tactical
presence.
Research Question
22 Type I firms “focus on the tactical environment. They offer services at the forefront of the battie
space, engaging in actual Hghting or direct command and control of field units, or both. In
many cases, they are utilized as ‘force multipliers’, with their employees distributed across
a client’s force to provide leadership and experience. Clients of type 1 firms tend to be
those with comparatively low military capabilities facing immediate, high threat situations.
PMFs sucli as Executive Outcomes and Sandline that otïer special forces-type services are
classic examples of military provider firms”. Refer notably to: Peter Warren Singer,
“Corporate Warriors: The Risc of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for
International Security”, International Security 26 (no. 3) (200 1/2002), 201.
23 Type 2 firms “provide advisory and training services. They offer strategic, operational, and/ or
organizational analysis that is often integral to the function or restructuring of armed
forces. The critical difference between type 1 and type 2 firms is the ‘trigger finger’ factor;
the task of consultants is to supplement the management and training of their client’s
military forces, not to engage in combat. Examples of type 2 %rms include Levdan,
Vinneil, and MPRI. Type 2 customers are usually in the midst of force restructuring or
aiming for a transformative gain in capabilities”. Refer notably to: Peter Warren Singer,
“Corporate Warriors: The Risc of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for
International Security”, 201.
24 Type 3 firms “rear-echelon and provide supplementary military services. Although they do flot
participate in the planning or execution of direct hostilities, they do fil functional need that
fail within the military sphere-including logistics, technicat support, and transportation-that
are critical to combat operations. The most common clients are those engaged in
immediate, but long-duration, interventions (i.e., standing forces and organizations
requiring a surge capacity”. Refer notably to: Peter Warren Singer, “Corporate Warriors:
The Risc of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for International
Security”, 202.
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This research seeks to analyze the influence and impact of PMFs in the
context of civil war resolution. Can combat driven PMFs help resolve conflicts and
restore peace in civil war tom countries? This research shah solely analyze the
effect of combat driven PMFs (type 1 firms) introduced earlier in Peter Singer’s
typology, and shah specifically focus on the cases of Angola and Sierra Leone,
where type 1 firms were employed. We shah test the hypothesis which affirms that
PMFs do in fact affect the process of conflict resolution by creating conditions of
ripeness (for political negotiation to take place).
William Zartman’s work identifies three main elements of ripeness: a
mutually hurting stalemate; an impending or recently avoided catastrophe; and an
alternative way out25. We shah try to demonstrate that, by altering the military
balance, PMFs do help in attaining one condition necessary for the realization of
ripeness: a Mutual Hurting Stalemate (MHS)26. Since the mandate of PMFs is often
narrow and precise and since their involvement is habituahly himited to mihitary
intervention, we shah attempt to prove that PMFs do in fact hehp tilt the military
balance in favor of their clients, and hence create a MHS.
This paper shall seek to confirm whether the involvement of PMFs brings
about the elements deemed necessary for a ripe moment according to Wihhiam
Zartman. In other words, this section shall seek to uncover whether or not there is a
relationship between the military oriented mandates/methods of PMFs and ripeness.
Unfortunately, the theories of war weariness and ripeness mostly shed light
on the initiation of negotiations rather than on the success of the negotiations in
question. Therefore, ripeness generates the conditions necessary for negotiations but
there is no guarantee that these negotiations wihl assure a permanent resolution of
the civil war. This study shall prove important since it will help in determining
whether PMFs are capable of creating conditions ripe for negotiations and conflict
resohution.
25
• William Zartman, “The Timing ofPeace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments”,
The Global Review oJEthnopolitics 1 (no. 1) (2001), 8-18.
26 This concept will be further elaborated on in Chapter Two Ripeness Theoiy.
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MethodoÏogy
We will rely on the analysis of secondary sources. Within the limited
framework of this thesis and in the face of financial restrictions, fieldwork will not
be retained as a chosen method of collecting data. The bulk of information will be
gathered through academic periodicals, manuscripts, officiai publications, data sets,
international treaties, national legal papers, United Nations (UN) resolutions, peace
treaties, press reieases, journal articles, and conferences relating to the subject
matter. There is obviously a large amount of readily available information
pertaining to the private military industry. However, the literature at hand possesses
various weaknesses, limitations and gaps. A significant portion of the literature is
mainly descriptive, biased, normative, and usually fails to measure up to standard
academic criteria which put emphasis on theoretical analysis. Furthermore, the lack
of existing and appropriate theoretical frameworks from which to work with lias left
scholars largely iii equipped to tacHe the complex issues surrounding the private
military industry. Hence, this research shah consciously take into account and
acknowledge these limitations.
The rationale behind the choice of Angola and Sierra Leone is that both case
studies are in many ways very similar and provide for comparative evaluation. Both
countries experienced seemingly intractable civil wars and both states were faihing
nations. With little other opportunities, both states turned to PMFs for assistance.
What’s more is that they both turned to the same PMF: Executive Outcomes (EO).
A doser study of the two case studies shah help us shed light on the various ways a
PMF can alter a given civil war. However, we reahize that it might be difficuit to
generalize from these two cases. Empirical findings are mostly tentative. In
addition, there are no estabhished criteria for judging and rating the effectiveness of
PMFs in conftict resolution settings. Therefore, the reader should bear in mmd that
the resuits may flot be applicable to ail cases where PMFs intervene.
Contribution of this study
16
This research is pertinent because it sheds light on a new type of actor who
can play the role of a third party in civil wars. It is also likely to shed light on the
potential for PMFs to contribute to civil conflict resolutions. There are presently
several approaches for resolving civil wars. However, relatively few have been
efficient and successful insofar. If research can lead to a better understanding of
these private actors and if it can shed light on the conditions favoring their proper
functioning, PMFs could potentially contribute to the resolution of protracted civil
wars by working in conjunction with political actors. Nonetheless, academic
analysis hitherto has led to very polarized conclusions. Hence, this paper shah seek
to determine whether or flot PMFs can contribute to the resolution of civil wars
within weak and faihing states.
17
THE PRIVATE MILITARY INDUSTRY
Private Militai-y Activity in an Era of Globalization
During tlie last two decades, the increasingly visible presence of PMFs has
manifested itself on tlie international scene. Tlic contemporary era marked by
lieightened and unconventional security threats lias incited the dramatic
proliferation of these new transnational corporate actors. The tliree major reasons
whicli explain the most recent rise in Private Military Companies (PMCs) use are:
“(1) the end of the Cold War and the vacuum of security it produced in the global
market27, (2) the transformation in the nature of warfare, and (3) the normative rise
of privatization”28. The rationale behind this sector’s dramatic growth bas clearly
been echoed by Tim Spicer of Sandiine friternational, a UK-based PMF, who
states: humiliating experiences
The business was established in the early 1990s to fil a vacuum in
the post cold war era. Our purpose is to offer governments and other
legitimate organizations specialized military expertise at a time when
western national desire to provide active support to friendly
governments, and to support them in conflict resolution, has
materiaily decreased, as lias their capability to do so29.
27 Although the US and Russia have been active players in key areas such as the Middle East, the
Baikans and Chechnya since the end of the Cold War, other areas or countries, namely
certain African states such as Angola and Sierra Leone, have failed to draw the attention of
these great powers following the détente period (as will be demonstrated and elaborated on
in the following chapters on Angola and Sierra Leone), hence creating considerable
security vacuums that allow PMFs to exploit. The US and Russia (and hence their
contribution to UN peace operations) have been less inclined to contribute troops and
explain casualties to their domestic constituencies following embarrassing experiences in
the past such as the Somali Affair where the US lost 18 of its men.
28 Peter Warren Singer, “Corporate Warriors. The Risc of the Privatized Military Industry and its
Ramifications for International Security”, 193 as cited in Iared F. Lawyer, 2003. The Role
ofPrivate Militai-y Corporations in Failing Nation States (presented at the conference on
Multinational Corporations, Development, & Conflict, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, 06
December 2003). Oxford: Queen Elizabeth House, 3.
29 Sandline International, “Overview of the Company”, available at.
<http:/!www.sandline.comlsite/index.html> (last updated April 16, 2004, page consulted
April 2006).
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Hence, with a large demand (scores of protracted civil wars, etc.) and a limited
supply of military services and assistance, these corporate bodies have found a
particular niche to exploit. This industry has literally corne to have a global reach,
ranging from suppÏying the logistics to NATO’s campaign against the Serbs, to
training and supporting Congo’s military30.
Using their flexible and efficient structure, PMFs have successfully
exploited the security gap whicli developed following the end of the Cold War.
Supplying a wide array of military-related services to clients, PMFs have been
involved in numerous intra and inter-state conflicts surfacing across the globe.
Their mandates are diverse, ranging from protecting weak states against arrned
insurrection to addressing the threat of terrorism. The involvernent of PMFs in
global security matters lias been 50 significant that they represented the “third
largest contributor to the war effort [in the War in fraq] after the United States and
Britain”31. Since it appears unlikely that the private military industry is a transitory
phenomenon, numerous scholars have demonstrated a growing interest in
researching this industry.
Defining the private militaty industiy
Although several scholars sucli as Deborali Avant32, Robert Mandel33, and
David Shearer34 have presented suitable definitions concerning the private rnilitary
industry, we shall borrow from Peter Singer who puts forward a clear,
parsimonious and functional account of PMFs. He defines them as “profit-driven
organizations that trade in professional services intricately linked to warfare”35.
° Peter Warren Singer, “Corporate Warriors. The Risc of the Privatized Military Industry and its
Ramifications for International Security”, 188.
31 Economist, March 25, 2004, “Mercenaries: The Baghdad boom”, available at.
<http://www.sandline.comlhotlinksfEconomist-Baghdad.html> (page consulted April
2006).
32 Deborah D. Avant, The Marketfor Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Robert Mandel, Al7nies without States. The Privatization ofSecuritt (BoulderfLondon: Lynne
Rienner, 2002).
David Shearer, Private Armies and Militaiy Interventions.
Peter Warren Singer, “Corporate Warriors. The Risc of the Privatized Military Industry and its
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This defïnition clearly highlights the dual military and economic (profit-driven)
nature of PMFs, which underscores the increasingly prevalence of neo-liberalism in
the post-Cold War era (numerous previously government —dominated sectors of the
economy are increasingly being outsourced and privatized). Peter Singer also
points to internai variations within the overail private military industry. He states
that PMFs “vary in their market capitalization, number of personnel, firm history,
corporate inter-relationships, employee experience and characteristics, and even the
geo-graphic location of their home base and operational zones”36. However, as
highlighted in the previous chapter, one single overarching factor unifies the
industry as a whole: “ail the firms within it offer services that fali within the
military domain”37 (which stili highlights the dual military and economic nature of
PMFs). This unifying element is vital since it incorporates each and every firm
within the private military industry contributing very diverse and often dissimilar
services. This manner of conceptualizing the industry is convenient since it is
sufficiently general to allow for sub-categorization, yet concise enough to allow us
to define PMFs as corporate bodies supplying diverse services falling under the
general umbrella of military assistance.
In addition, scholars have for the most part also stressed the importance of
the corporate nature of PMFs in order to differentiate the contemporary private
military industry from the traditional and politically charged notion of mercenary38.
Corporatization is a key element in distinguishing PMFs from mercenaries39. PMFs
are structured, which entails a certain degree of hierarchy and chain of command.
They are:
organized in business form [...] this in contrast to either the ad-hoc
structure of individual mercenaries forming loose units or the social
makeup of many of the historic contract units (such as the Swiss
regiments that were local militias marketed abroad) [...] PMFs are
ordered along pre-existing corporate unes, usually with a clear
Ramifications for International Security”, 186.
36 Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrior, The Rise of the Privatized Mititaiy Industîy, 88.
Ibid., 88.
38 Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security.
There are stili important similarities between mercenaries and PMFs but these similarities vary
according and depending on the type ofPMF being analyzed (Type 1, 2 or 3). The issue of
differences and similarities between PMFs and mercenaries is debatable and contentious.
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executive hierarchy that includes boards of directors and share
holders40.
Although there remains some confusion over the differentiation between
PMFs and mercenaries, most authors concur that PMFs are institutionalized and
corporate endeavors which perform a wide anay of functions, ranging from logistic
support to intelligence gathering. Unlike the classical notion of a mercenary
extolled in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions and the 1989
UN International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training
of Mercenaries41, many scholars such as Deborah Avant, David Shearer and Peter
Singer insist that “a military company advertises its services and is legally
registered [...J personnel are employed within a defined structure, with established
terms and conditions, and work with a degree of organization and accountability42
to the company”43. The company in turn “is answerable to its clients, often under a
legally binding contract”44. Therefore, although PMFs may share certain
characteristics in common with mercenaries, they should, aÏthough debatable, be
considered first and foremost as corporate actors specialized in the supply of
military related services.
Differentiating PMFs from mercenaries is not merely a semantics exercise.
The two terms of inquiry also carry legal ramifications. Under “international law,
individuals who seil military services on their own — better known as mercenaries —
are generally thouglit to be prohibited”45. There are several international laws that
render illegal mercenary activity, most notably the 1989 UN international
° Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrioi; The Risc of the Frivatized Militai-y Indttstiy, 45.
11 Peter Warren Singer, “War, Profit, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and
International Law”, Cotombia Journal of International Law 42 (no. 2) (2004), 527-530.
42 Although the personnel of the PMf Executive Outcomes (EO), as will be demonstrated in Chapter
Three Case Study Angola, worked for both opposing parties in Angola, it did so at different
times (BO worked for UNITA during the Cold War and for the government afler the Cold
War) and neyer broke out of a contract for the next highest bidder. Although PMFs are
profit-driven and might flot adhere to values such as ideological, ethnic, or religious (etc.)
loyalties, they are stiil legally bound by cofltracts and desire to upkeep a sound corporate
image in order to attract new clients and contracts.
u David Shearer, Private Armies and Militai-y Interventions, 21.
Ibid., 21.
u Peter Warren Singer, “War, Profit, and the Vacuum ofLaw: Privatized Military Firms and
International Law”, 524.
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convention against the use of mercenaries, the 1977 Additional Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 regional treaty in Africa for the elimination of
mercenarism in Africa by the Organization of African Unity46. Although these
international treaties and legal endeavors are vital for banning mercenaries, and
aÏthough they reflect the international political concerns raised over mercenaries
and their impact on African military affairs (they also reflect the existing and actual
problems inherent in mercenarism and their possible connections to the private
military industry, hence their possible parallel impacts), they have nonetheless
failed to concretely be instrumental in regulating private military activity since they
do not adequately address PMFs and their distinctive and complex nature (dual
military and corporate nature), distinct from mercenaries. Many, even including
Enrique Ballesteros the UN-appointed expert on the subject, have admitted that
international legal definitions concerning mercenaries are of little assistance in
dealing with the privatized military industry. For the reasons stated above, it has
been difficuit to regulate the activities of PMFs since they are considered to be
corporate bodies (in the reaim of security), flot random individuals, thus falling in
key loopholes of international law.
Although many scholars and policymakers now distinguisli PMFs from
mercenaries, most, namely the UN Speciat Rapporteur on the use ofmercenaries
Ballesteros and former Secretary General Kofi Annan, also remain guarded in
relation to use of PMFs and caution for a vigilant and prudent manner of employing
these firms. In Rwanda, Kofi Annan reflected upon employing PMFs in order to
stabilize the situation and protect refugees from combatants. However, he stated
that the world was probably not ready to come to terms with this trend of
privatization in the reaim of security and peace47. Although certain similarities may
be established between PMFs and mercenaries, PMFs are in point of fact flot
analogous to legendary mercenary figures such as Frenchman Bob Denard or
American born Bob MacKenzie who were individuals accountable and bound by
46 Jesse Selber and Kebba Iobarteh, “From Enemy to Peacemaker: the role of private military
companies in sub-Saharan Africa”, Medicine and Global Survival 7 (no. 2) (2002), 93-94.
“ Stephen Fidier and Thomas Catan “Private Military Companies Pursue the Peace Dividend”,
Financial Times, July 2003.
22
no mies or corporate guideline and directives48. In order for a PMF to act legaily, it
must be supporting the officiai ruling government in order to assist in preserving
national sovereignty49. Tliey can only (theoreticaliy) serve tlie interests of a ruling
government, flot of rebel insurgencies. One particular PMF, EO, has proven itself
reiiabie, lias remained loyal to its employers, “lias flot switched sides, lias not
threatened tlie government, and lias flot shirked from combat — [fourj traits of many
past mercenary operations”50. PMFs are aiso required to adliere to national laws
concernrng licensing and registration regulations.
Nevertlieiess, domestic iaws are fairiy easy to circumvent since there exists
littie domestic reguiation regarding tlie privatized miiitary industry in countries
otlier tlian tlie US, UK and Soutli Africa51. Analysts usuaily concur that tlie two
groups of actors are very different, but that “tliere are, as yet, no common
definitions, standards and metliodologies tliat can be used to delineate tlie
boundaries of tlie phenomenon being discussed”52.
Peter Singer points to the fact tliat tliere is yet no universal convergence
pertaining to a suitable definition of even tlie most widely used terms. No
“framework of analysis of tlie industry exists, no elucidation of tlie variation in tlie
private military firm’ s activities and impact, no attempts at examining tlie industry
as a whole, and no comparative analyses”53. Tliis apparent lack of consensus
represents a serious setback for research. It inliibits tlie development of explanatory
and predictive tlieories of PMF beliavior and lias already had various concrete
repercussions. For exampie, the failure to clearly define and cliaracterize PMFs lias
rendered nearïy ail international legal initiatives concerned witli tlie regulation of
Ken Silverstein, Private Warriors (London: Verso, 2000), 147.
Peter Warren Singer, “War, Profit, and the Vacuum ofLaw: Privatized Military Firms and
International Law”.
50 Herbert M. Howe, “Private Security Forces and African Stability: the case of Executive
Outcomes”, 317.
51 The “South African government has made the most direct domestic attempt to regulate the private
military industry; under the provisions [ofthe 1997 Regulation offoreign Military
Assistance Bili], any military firm based in South Africa is compelled to seek government
authorization for each contract it signs, whether the operation is local or extraterritorial”.
Refer notably to: Peter Warren Singer, “War, Profit, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized
Military Firms and International Law”, 539.
52 Robert Mande!, Armies without States. The Privatization of Security, 127-128.
Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrior, Tise Rise ofthe Privatized Militaiy Industiy, viii.
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these corporate actors dysfunctional. Article 47 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I of
the Geneva Conventions and the 1989 International Convention against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries are both ineffectual due
to conceptual and semantic ambiguities54.
CÏasstf,ving FMFs
Numerous authors have attempted to classify the private military industry
by providing a taxonomy regrouping PMFs into sub-categories. Once again, there
does not appear to be a clear consensus among scholars as to which criteria to be
adopted for this type of classification. For pragmatic reasons, we shah use Peter
Singer’ s ‘Tip-of-the-Spear’ typology, which despite certain weaknesses remains
one of the most functional theoretical classifications. Peter Singer’s approach
recognizes the dual nature of the private military industry. At “its base level, the
industry is driven by both military and economic fundamentals [...] a successful
typology of its constituent parts must take into account both elements”55. Peter
Singer’ s typology clearly takes into account the corporate nature of PMFs since the
tip-of-the-spear distinction-by military unit location-is analogous to how
outsourcing’s linkage with business chains also break down56. According to the tip
of-the-spear typology, PMFs are broken down into three broad categories: type 1
military provider firms (such as Executive Outcomes and Sandhine), type 2 military
consultant firms (such as MPRI and Vinnell), and type 3 military support firms
(such as Boeing Services and Hohmes)57. Each category is linked to a specific
physical location in the battie space.
This research paper will exclusiveÏy focus on type h mihitary provider firms
(versus military consultant and mihitary support firms), which are distinctively
positioned in one specific physical location on a theatre of combat. As explicated in
the previous chapter, type 1 firms focus on the tactical environment. hi a “military
David Shearer, Private Armies and Mititaly Interventions, 16.
Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrio,; The Rise ofthe Privatized Mititaiy Indust,y, 91.
56 Ibid., 91.
Ibid., 93.
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sense, they provide services at the forefront of the battie-space, by engaging in
actual fighting, either as une units or specialists andlor direct command and control
of field units”58. And as was mentioned earlier, in many cases, they are utilized as
force multiptiers, with their employees distributed across a client’s force to provide
leadership and experience59. What is particularly interesting to us concerning type 1
firms is that they directly work and maneuver in the Theater of Operation
(explicitly the tactical battlefield), considered to be the very tip of the spear60. Due
to their direct presence on the battlefield, they hold the potential of altering the
local military balance. What is also particularly interesting about type 1 firms in the
context of this study is that their clients are different than those of type 2 and 3
firms in various respects.
Clients and the Demandfor Private Mulitary Services
Clients of military provider firms tend to be weak national governments
with comparativeiy low military capabilities facing immediate, high threat
situations. Failing to exert effective control over the territory they govern and
unable of providing security to their own citizens, govemments within failing and
weak states are often incapable of maintaining or restoring internal stability. A
number of these states, such as Angola and Sierra Leone, have turned to PMFs for
assistance in resolving theirs conflicts. Due in part to their proficient, resourceful
and supple manner of conducting business, transnational corporate actors
specialized in the supply of military services are capable of offering weak and
failing states a viable solution to an immediate and rapidly escalating threat.
As is often the case with weak and failing states facing immediate internai
threats, the outsourcing of PMFs is often done under the guise of ‘Force
Multipliers’. Although PMFs are capable of putting forward overall unit packages
(stand-alone tactical miÏitary units), they are most regularly contracted out as
specialized Force Multipliers. They provide assistance wherever there is a vacuum
58 Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrio, The Rise of the Privatized Militaiy Industiy, 92.
59Ibid., 92.
60 Ibid., 92.
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of security and expertise. The addition of “a few highly sldlled personnel to ‘stiffen
the backs’ can have dramatic impact, alUn to past colonial armies that mixed tribal
levees with trained officers”61. Therefore, the effectiveness of force multipliers is
flot found in their numbers, but rather in their specialized tactical role and physical
presence on the terrain.
Although type 1 firms will be the focal point of this analysis, a more
attentive look at the Angola and Sierra Leone case studies will clearly demonstrate
that the type 1 firms employed in both cases frequently provide services and
functions falling under the rubric of type 2 and 3 firms62. Therefore, one should
bear in mmd that there is a significant degree of overlap between the three broad
categories enumerated in Peter Singer’s typology. Despite this overlap, this
research shah nonetheless highlight and emphasize the characteristics proper to
type Ï firms since they expose the direct physical presence of civilian contractors
on the battle field alongside local forces, and the strategic and tactical effect this
might have on the rnilitary dimension of the conflict.
PMFs and Intra-State Confiict Resotution
Although the services of private military provider firms have been
outsourced by numerous weak and failing states experiencing civil conflict, there is
littie research on the concrete effects engendered by these actors in relation to
conflict resolution. This thesis shall seek to analyze the influence and impact of
PMFs in the context of civil war resolution. Can combat driven PMFs help resolve
conflicts and restore peace in civil war tom countries? In order to answer this
question, we shah test a first hypothesis which affirms that PMFs do in fact affect
the process of conflict resolution by creating a condition of ripeness: a MHS63. We
shah examine whether PMFs are capable of redressing symmetry in civil conflicts
by directly changing the tide of military operations via their local strategic and
Doug Brooks. “Write a Cheque, End a War Using Private Military Companies to End African
Conflict” Conflict Trends, (JuIy 2000) no.6 as cited in Peter Warren Singer, Corporate
Warriw; The Rise ofthe Privaticed Militai-v Industiy, 95.
62 Refer to Chapter Introduction for further information on type 2 and 3 firms.
This concept will be further elaborated on in Chapter Two Ripeness Theorv.
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tactical presence and hence provoke a MHS, thus maldng negotiations more likely.
The following chapter will elaborate on the relation between Ripeness Theory and
PMFs. It will focus on the potential role PMFs can play in the resolution of a civil
war.
27
RIPENESS TUEORY
Intra-State Wars and Negotiations
Many schoiars such as Roy Licldider64 assumed that the demise of the
Soviet Union wouid lead to a New World Order characterized by international
order, stability and peace. However, the rise in civil wars, transnational threats, and
terrorism shattered this belief. Iii 1999, Former US Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger was asked if the world seemed iike a safer place. He replied that “from
the point of view of nuclear danger, infinitely safer, from the point of view of
structure, far more chaotic”6. No global order has yet emerged to replace the
bipolar system which once stabilized international relations for over a haif decade.
0f particular interest to this paper is the increase in the number of civil wars
witnessed in the past two decades. Intra-state wars have typically been more
challenging to resolve than inter-state wars. They are described as the most difficuit
conflicts to resoive by the means of negotiations. Only “a quarter to a third of
modem civil wars (including anti colonial wars) have found their way to
negotiation, whereas more than haif of modem interstate wars have done so”66.
Furthermore:
About two-thirds of the internai conflicts have ended in the surrender
or elimination of one of the parties invoived; fewer than a quarter of
the international conflicts have so ended [...] yet in internai conflicts
more than in interstate wars, defeat of the rebeliion often merely
drives the cause underground, to emerge at a later time; on the other
hand, in principle, negotiation is the best poiicy for both parties in an
internai conflict67.
64 Roy Lickiider, “The Consequences ofNegotiated Settiements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993”, The
Arnerican Potitical Science Review 89 (no. 3) (1995), 68 1-690.
65 Tim Spicer, An Unorthodox Soldie, Peace and War and the Sandiine Affair (EdinburghfLondon:
Mainstream Publishing Company, 1999), 16.
66 Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1983) and Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War:
International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990),
as cited in I. William Zartman, Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars
(Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 3.
67 William Zartman, Ehisive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington D.C.: The
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Taking into consideration these figures, scliolarly empliasis lias increasingiy been
axed on the different strategies possibiy leading to the initiation of negotiations in
civil wars.
Intra-State Wars andAsyminetïy
One of the reasons expiaining the complexity in resolving civil wars is very
often their asymmetricai structure whereby one party is disproportionably stronger
than the other. Asymmetry signifies that “the most propitious conditions for
resolving conflicts are difficult to obtain”68. This particular feature of civil wars is
considered in-conducive to negotiations since it further complicates negotiation
dynamics, hence often rendering intra-state wars intractable. But what exactly is it
about asymmetry that renders civil wars protracted?
The link between asymmetry and intractability is found in power dynamics.
A symmetricai structure impiies that both players are in a situation of parity, often
military parity, therefore causing a stalemate or a deadlock. A stalemate often
suggests that a conflict lias reached a plateau since players find themseives in an
impasse where neither is predominant. If neither is predominant, neither lias the
hope of reaching unilaterai victory, hence viewing a negotiated resolution of the
conflict as favorable (the consequence of war weariness)69. On the other hand,
asymmetry “of an internai conflict rarely produces the stalemate needed for
negotiations”70.
The link between asymmetry and intractabiiity can be made clear via two
lines of reasoning. The first lias been termed the commitment problem argument. It
can be iliustrated through a scenario in which the government is strong and the
rebeis are weak. Severai authors such as lames Fearon71 explain that negotiations in
Brookings Institution, 1995), 3.
68
• William Zartman, Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, 8.
I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985/1989).
° I. William Zartman, Etusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, 8.
71 lames D. Fearon 2004. “Why do some Civil Wars Last so much longer than Others’?”, Journal of
Feace Research 41 (no. 3): 275-301.
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such circumstances are complicated by what they cail a conmiitment problem72.
They argue tliat “the central obstacle to ending a civil war by negotiation is that
mutual disarmament by govemment and rebel forces is a Prisoners’ Dilemma in
which neither can tolerate any risk of being ‘suckered”73. Already in a situation of
inferiority and of mutual distrust, rebels have little guarantee that once they
abandon their arms, the govemment will not re-launch another offensive line of
attack. By disarming for the sake of risky and prospective negotiations, rebels are
increasing their level of vulnerability vis-à-vis their opponent. Rebels who are in a
weaker position have no real guarantee or incentive to disarm in order to initiate a
negotiation process. The lack of trust, confidence, and often communication
seriously hinders chances of opening a window of opportunity for negotiations74.
This scenario thus demonstrates how asymmetry can be in-conducive to
negotiations.
The second line of reasoning lias been termed the unitaterat victoiy
argument. It supposes that both the govemment and rebels are strong but very
disproportionably. Embedded in the logic of attrition theory, the reasoning folÏows:
if one party (suppose the government) is overwhelmingly strong, it bas no real
incentive to negotiate with its counterpart since it stili hopes to escalate the conflict
until it reaches unilateral victory. Tlie goal is to conquer and anniliilate the
adversary in order to reap ail the benefits of a unilateral victory. In other words,
both strong parties hope to win since the benefits of prolonging a war appear to
outweigh the costs. Thus, circumstances behind asymmetrical structures render
conflicts intractable since they are flot conducive to negotiations. Conditions of
asymmetry therefore favor intractability75.
Given that an asymmetrical civil war lias very limited cliances of being
resolved through negotiation, we may conclude that the very creation of
symmetrical circumstances can open a window of opportunity for a negotiated
72 lames D. Featon 2004. “Why do some Civil Wars Last so much 1oner han Others?”, Journal of
Peace Research 41 (no. 3): 275-301.
Ibid., 291.
Ibid., 275-301.
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resolution. Stated otherwise, symmetry, whereby both opponents76 are in a situation
of balanced military capabilities (contributing to war weariness), can create ripe
moments for negotiations. Let us elaborate further on this matter.
According to public choice notions of rationality and public choice studies
of war termination and negotiation77, individuals are rational beings who make
choices based on cost-benefit analysis. In the context of civil wars, each of the
affected parties will seek to evaluate the costs and benefits associated with the
prolongation of war. A party will opt for the alternative which best serves its
personal interests. A decision to alter its original course of action will be induced
by increasing pain associated with a costly war. People “seek to avoid a loss of a
certain amount more than they seek a gain of the same amount”78. They are Ïoss
averse. If both parties are in a situation of parity (symmetrical structure), there is
little hope for either of them to reach unilateral victory. Each party wiÏl hence begin
to feel uncomfortable in the costly dead-end state of affairs. The more both parties
bear and suffer the costs associated with the prolongation of war, the more they will
likely reconsider halting their course of action in favor of negotiations (if neither is
able to achieve its aims of victory-war weariness)79. In other words, the stalemate
wiÏl be painful to the both of them. Hence, a MHS is the reflection of symmetry.
Both are conducive to negotiations.
Ripeness Theoiy
Many scholars have devoted their work to the study of conflict resolution in
the context of civil wars. Authors such as Christopher Mitcheil, Jeffrey Rubin,
76 The intervention of PMFs in civil wars involving more than two betligerents wiIl flot be examined
within the framework of this thesis. The topic of PMF intervention in intra-state wars
involving more than two main parties might however be an interesting research avenue to
be examined in future studies.
Steven J. Brams and Marek P. Hessel, “Threat Power in Sequential Games”, International Studies
Quarterty 28 (no.1) (1984), 23-44.
78 William Zartman, “Ripeness” Beyond Intractabititv. eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess.
Conflict Research Consortium (University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: August 2003),
available at. <http :!!www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/> (page consutted
April 2006).
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Stephen Stedman, and William Zartman just to narne a few, have based their
research on the concept of ripeness, which revolves around the notion of timing for
negotiations. The concept of a ripe moment “centers on the parties’ perception of a
[...] MHS, optimally associated with an impending, past, or recently avoided
catastrophe”80. Ripeness is based on the notion that when both parties find
themselves “locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this
deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degree or for
the same reasons), they seek an alternative policy or Way Out”81.
Although there are many variants and different interpretations within this
body of literature, Ripeness Theory speculates that there are specffic moments
during the course of a civil war where conditions facilitate a negotiated
resolution82. Because the conditions and nature of a civil war change over time,
certain stages during the life span of a civil war are more susceptible to develop
into opportunities for negotiation and settiernent over others (if the occasion is
seized). As the conditions of a civil war fluctuate, occasions for resolution corne
and go. William Zartman refers to these specific moments as ripe83. He states that
a ripe moment is one at which “the parties’ motivation to settie the conflict is as its
highest”84. Therefore, it is implicit that even if there might be a drive and
willingness to resolve a conflict, the conditions present at that very moment might
not be conducive for a negotiated resolution since the conflict may not yet be ripe.
An important point to note is that:
ripeness is only a condition, necessary but flot sufficient, for the
initiation of negotiations. It is flot self-fulfilling or self
implementing. It must be seized, either directly by the parties or, if
not, through the persuasion of a mediator. Thus, it is flot identical to
its results, which are flot part of its definition, and therefore flot
tautological. Not ail ripe moments are so seized and turned into
80
• William Zartman and M. Berman, The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1982), 66-78.
$11 William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments”, 8.
82 William Zartman, Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars.
83 William Zartman, (2001). “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe
Moments”, 8-18.
I. William Zartman, (2000), “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond”, in International
Conflict Resolution After the Cold War’, eds. Paul C. Stem and Daniel Druckman,
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 228.
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negotiations, hence the importance of specifying the meaning and
evidence of ripeness so as to indicate when conflicting or third
parties can fruitfulÏy initiate negotiations. Although ripeness theory
is not predictive in the sense that it can teli when a given situation
will become ripe, it is predictive in the sense of identifying the
elements necessary (even if flot sufficient) for the productive
inauguration of negotiations85.
Numerous studies have shown that “a mutually hurting stalemate defines
the moment as ripe for resolution: both sides are locked in a situation from which
they cannot escalate the conflict with their available means and at an acceptable
cost”86. Such a “stalemate provides a window of opportunity that is narrow and
highly conditional; it depends on perceived rather than objective reality, on a
stalemate that affects both sides, and on a discomfort (preferably increasing) feit by
both parties”87. Although “the pain does flot have to be equal or the stalemate
exactly balanced, the asymmetry of internai conflict rarely produces the stalemate
needed for negotiations”88. MHSs, which provide incentives for parties to resolve
their conflict through negotiations, are lengthy and intensive periods of violence
from which neither of the fighting parties are likely to achieve a one-sided
unilateral victory.
Put differently, a MHS is a costly situation whereby opponents are in a state
of military rougli power parity (symmetry) whereby no one side in a conflict
predominates and hence, become locked in a painful deadiock. According to Eric
Brahm89, parity refers to a situation where a conftict reaches a point at which a sort
of equilibrium sets in which neither side is getting any doser to achieving its goals
and which no one is liappy with the situation. Once conflicts escalate for a whule,
they often reach a stalemate.
Stalemates can exist under different forms. Christopher Mitcheli has
elaborated on three sucli forms:
85
• William Zartman, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments”, 9.
86 j Wifliam Zartman, “Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa”, 2d. ed. (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989) as cited in I. William Zartman, Elusive Peace.
Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), 8.
87 William Zartman, Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, 8.
88 Ibid., 8.
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Research Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder, (lune 2004).
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(1) a stalemate of desperation, where both sides are exhausted
and no victory is in sight; (2) a stalemate of attrition, where
neither side is being signfficantly hurt but neither can destroy or
neutralize the other; (3) a stalemate of frustration, where
adversaries have corne to recognize that they cannot achieve a
clear-cut victory that achieves ail their goals, whatever their
expenditure of effort and resources90.
Despite these variations, a stalemate can usually be understood as a painful plateau
following an intense and rapid escalation of a conflict. Therefore, there is a clear
link between ripeness and symmetry. If one can alter the local conditions in order
to create symmetry and hence a MHS (since a MHS is a reflection of symmetry and
military parity), the timing might then become ripe for a negotiated resolution.
Recognizing a MIlS
Inherent in ripeness theory and a MHS are both objective and subjective
elements91. The objective existence of a military stalemate or military symmetry is
not sufficient for the determination of a ripe moment92. Rather, the conditions of a
hurting staÏemate must be subjectively perceived by the affected parties, hence
rnaldng them recognize the costs associated with the continuation of violence and
conflict. Locating and identifying a ripe moment requires research and intelligence
studies to identify the objective and subjective elements93. Subjective expressions
of “pain, impasse, and inability to bear the cost of further escalation, related to the
objective evidence of a stalemate, [...] and/or other such indicators of MHS [...J,
° Christopher R. Mitcheli, “Cutting Losses: Reflections On Appropriate Timing” , January 1, 1996,
ICAR Working Paper 9, 3.
91 William Zartman, “Ripeness” Beyond Intractability. eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess.
Conflict Research Consortium (University ofColorado, Boulder. Posted: August 2003),
available at. <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/> (page consulted April
2006).
92 Michael E. Salla, “Creating the Ripe Moment in the East Timor Conflict”, Journal ofPeace
Research 34 (no. 4) (1997), 451.
I. William Zartman, “Ripeness” Beyond Intractabitity. eUs. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess.
Conffict Research Consortium (University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: August 2003),
available at. <http://www.beyondintractabi1ity.org/essay/ripeness/> (page consulted April
2006).
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can be researched on a regular basis in a conflict to establish where a ripeness
exists”94.
Since finding the occurrence of a MHS necessitates research on both the
objective and subjective elements, we shah further shed light on what exactly these
elements consist of. We shail seek to uncover which conditions contribute to how
elites perceive their party’s strategic position in a conftict and thus their desirability
to negotiate. We shall start by introducing a list of conditions that make up a MHS
(if of course they are subjectively perceived by the military and political authorities
as costly for them). Four indicators will be used to elaborate on the elements which
assist in creating a MHS95: 1) Territory; 2) Military; 3) Economic; 4) Political.
Let us begin with our first indicator being territory. Exercising authority
over national territory in the context of a civil war, as opposed to inter-state wars, is
a particularly important and strategic advantage to have since both adversaries live
and subsist on the very same land. More specifically though, it is to a party’s
advantage to seek control over: 1) strategic sites in regions rich in natural resources
like oil and mine fields (a potential source of income for funds allocated to military
operations); 2) borders which can be crucial for trading, restocldng, rearmament
and smuggling (human and material); 3) key infrastructures (such as central
highways, ports, airports, communication and radio centers); 4) mihitary bases
which are essential for logistical, organizational and command purposes. A party’s
failure to exercise effective control over national territory will inevitably inflict
many costs. However, if both parties manage to obtain territorial advantages on a
relatively balanced scale, they might become trapped in a MHS as they reach a sort
of equilibrium in terms of territorial acquisitions. This impasse and military
deadlock will most hikely force both camps to reconsider their options since both
have less chances of escalating the war to unilateral victory. All that said, territory
is thus a key variable in the context of elements leading to a MHS.
I. William Zartman, “Ripeness” Beyond Intractabitity. eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess.
Conflict Research Consortium (University ofCotorado, Boulder. Posted: August 2003),
available at. <http:!!www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/> (page consulted April
2006).
These will be applied in the two case studies in order to discern a Iink between private military
intervention and a MHS.
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Our second indicator used for the purpose of uncovering a MHS is miÏitary.
The military capability indicator will 5e subcategorized in three sections: 1) troops;
2) equipment; 3) strategy and tactics. We will make use of data on the number of
troops dispatched, on troop quaiity, on the use of technology, and on support
systems (etc.). These subgroups have been deemed important for determining a
MHS since logically spealdng, the more miiitary parity (balance in military
capabilities) there is between two opponents, the iess both parties can hope to
achieve a unilateral victory. Military parity combined with the costs associated with
a military deadlock will undeniably contribute to a MHS.
Our third indicator used for the purpose of uncovering a MHS is econorny.
We shah seek to examine the economic costs associated with a war. We wili use
data on Gross Domestic Product (GDP), debt, social spending, sanctions, and
blockades (etc.). Economic factors are important to study since the more a war
hurts a party in economic terms, the less it can viably achieve victory. Less hope of
attaining a unilaterai victory combined with additional costs associated with the
prolongation of war makes negotiations appear more profitable and cost-effective
(war weariness).
Finally, we shah make use of a fourth indicator: politicat factors. A party’s
reputation can alter its legitimacy and credibility vis-à-vis both the state’s internai
populace and the international community, thus affecting its chances of prevailing
in an intra-state war. A lack of credibility andlor legitimacy might hinder the
affected party’s chances of success by: 1) himiting the party’s access to global
markets (engendering a ioss of trade); 2) denying the party local support from the
country’s population (local assistance and alliance maldng can often 5e crucial in
civil wars); 3) submitting the party to foreign pressure via international
condemnation; 3) engendering a loss in foreign investment and foreign aid; 4) an
imposition of a blockade mandated by an external party such as the UN or another
organization or state. Hence, pohitical factors are indeed important when
considering a MHS.
Ail four indicators thus inftict costs on the affected parties of a civil war.
Each of the main parties directly involved must bear and suffer the costs, but flot
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necessarily for the same reasons or at equal degrees. Hence, it is the perception of
the objective condition rather than the condition itself that generates a MHS96.
Ripeness Theory thus draws on cost benefit analysis for reviewing intra-state
conflicts and the implicated parties’ respective positions97. In game theoretic terms,
it marks:
the transformation of the situation in the parties’ perception from a
prisoners’ dilemma (PDG) into a chicken dilemma game (CDG)
(Bramns 1985, Goldstein 199$), or, in other terms, the realization
that the status quo or no negotiation [...] is a negative-sum situation,
and that to avoid the zero-sum outcomes now considered impossible
[...] the positive-suffi outcome [...] must be explored98.
Ripeness Theoty and Critics
Although Ripeness Theory bas often been employed to determine the right
moment whcn conditions are conducive to successful negotiations, a number of
scholars such as Jeffrey Rubin have denounced the theoretical body of literature99.
According to Jeffrey Rubin, Ripeness Theory can promote a certain degree of
passivity on the part of third parties (such as the UN or extemal Powers). The
absence of a ripe moment may serve as a pretext for non-intervention. As a resuit,
extemal parties to a conftict might take advantage of this valid excuse for not
getting involved, even if genocide or other forms of human rights abuses occur100.
96
• Wiliiam Zartman, “Ripeness” Bevond Intractability. eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi
Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium (University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: August
2003), available at. <http://www.beyondintractabiiity.org/essay/ripeness/> (page consulted
April 2006).
The “careful case study by Stephen J. Stedman (1991) ofthe Rhodesian negotiations for
independence as Zimbabwe takes the concept beyond a single perception into the
complexities of internai dynamics; Stedman specifies that some but flot ail parties must
perceive the hurting stalemate, that patrons rather than parties may be the agents of
perception, that the miiitary element in each party is the crucial element in perceiving the
stalemate, and that the way out is as important an ingredient as the stalemate in that ail
parties may weli sec victory in the alternative outcome prepared by negotiatiofi”. Refer
notabiy to I. Wiliiam Zartman, Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, 10.
I. William Zartman, “The Timing ofPeace Initiatives: Hurting Staiemates and Ripe Moments”, 9.
Jeffrey Z. Rubin, “The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing”, in Timing the De
Escalation of International Conflicts, eds. Thorson Stuart J., Syracuse, NY: Syracuse
University Press, 1991.
100 Jeffrey Z. Rubin, “The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing”, in Timing the De
Escalation oflitternational Conflicts, eds. Thorson Stuart J., Syracuse, NY: Syracuse
University Press, 1991.
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Although this criticism is warranted, evidence and past instances fail to consistently
corroborate the concern raised above. The active engagement of Third Parties,
which can be in the form of mediation or partisan support, can actually alter and
manipulate a local situation in order to provoke a stalemate and hence contribute to
the creation of a ripe moment. Therefore, Jeffrey Rubin’s concems might be
appeased since external parties do flot aiways remain indifferent to confficts flot
readily ripe for a negotiated resolution. Although their efforts might flot directly be
geared towards the final stages of a resolution, external parties may for example
intervene by emphasizing the benefits of a negotiated resolution or by actually
producing incentives and benefits associated with a negotiation (etc.).
If some:
objective elements are present, persuasion is the obvious diplomatic
challenge. Such was the message of Kissinger in the Sinai
withdrawal negotiations [...J and Crocker in the Angolan
negotiations [...J, among many others, emphasizing the absence of
real alternatives (stalemate) and the high costs of the current conflict
course (pain). If there is no objective indicator to which to refer,
ripening may involve a much more active engagement of the
mediator, moving that role from communication and formulation to
manipulation. As a manipulator [...], the mediator either increases
the size of the stakes, attracting the parties to share in the pot that
otherwise would have been too smaÏl, or limits the actions of the
parties in conflict, providing objective elements for the stalemate.
Such actions are delicate and dangerous, but on occasion necessary.
US massive aid incentives to Israel and Egypt to negotiate a second
5mai withdrawal in 1975, NATO bombing of Serb positions in
Bosnia in 1995 to create a hurting stalemate, or the American arming
oflsrael during the October war in 1973, or ofMorocco (after two
years of moratorium) in 1981 to keep those parties in the conflict,
respectively, among many others, are typical examples of the
mediator acting as a manipulator to bring about a stalemate’°’.
These examples have established that the notion of a Ripe Moment does not
necessarily have to be one with a passive undertone, since a situation can actively
be ripened by external parties in order to promote conditions favorable for
negotiations. Therefore, third party players can help induce a military stalemate in
‘°‘ I. William Zartman, “The Timing ofPeace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments”,
15.
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order to form a ripe moment. The motives for intervention on the part of Third
Parties are flot relevant here. Their motives may be moral, financial, or political.
Third Party players might intervene because they are called upon by one local actor
who might flot be impartial in the conflict and who might not necessarily wish to
achieve peace via the involvement of the invited Third Party player. Therefore, the
motive for intervention does flot necessarily have to be the ripening of the situation.
Whether the ripening of the situation is intended or flot is flot of importance here.
Rather, the concrete outcome of third party intervention is what matters.
Ripeness Theoty and PMFs
For the sake of this paper, we shah seek to uncover whether or not biased
third party intervention, in the form of private military assistance (acting as external
manipulators), can help create or expedite the achievement of negotiated
settlements by creating a MHS, a necessary condition for ripeness. Parallel to the
1995 NATO bombings in Bosnia, wc shall seek to uncover whether or not the
active military engagement of PMFs, in particular of EO, on the terrain in Angola
and Sierra Leone, have helped to create a mutually hurting stalemate by the means
of manipulating local military balances and redressing local symmetry, hence
creating military parity and a painful deadlock. Can PMFs create MHSs? Put
differently, we will ask ourselves whether private military involvement, by
redressing the military symmetry to create a military stalemate, can be a solution to
the problem raised by Jeffrey Rubin of passivity within the ripeness theory.
In order to determine the effect of PMFs in both case studies, we shall by
the use of our indicators pay particular attention to the objective conditions created
by PMFs and study how private military involvement subjectively altered the
affected parties’ considerations in their cost-benefit calculations. Hence, we shail
determine whether PMF intervention changed the game from a prisofler’s dilemma
to a chicken dilemma game by maldng the parties realize that they cannot
unilaterally escalate the conflict in order to achieve a one-sided victory. In the cases
of Angola and Sierra Leone, the mandate and activities of EO wiÏl be studied in
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order to determine the local concrete effects provoked by these private actors.
Objective and subjective factors resulting in costs for ail parties will be dissected in
order to put forth and clarify the causal relationship between PMF intervention
(dependent variable) and the attainment of negotiations-ripeness (independent
variable).
The next two chapters shall test the hypothesis that combat driven PMFs,
via their military and strategic capabilities, can contribute to the resolution of intra
state wars by creating a MHS (by redressing the symmetry), a necessary condition
for ripeness/political negotiations (which are themselves indispensable but not
sufficient for a permanent resolution of a conftict). If the hypothesis is validated,
PMFs could be perceived as representing the private equivalent of military peace
enforcers (military function) which help create windows of opportunity for
negotiations, where political actors take on the charge to complete the process of
resolving the conflict by taking on the role of peace makers (political function).
It is very clear that PMFs alone are not sufficient for restoring long term
peace and it is not the objective of this paper to suggest that PMFs can unilaterally
and permanently resolve a civil war. As the ripeness theory explicitly states, the
notion of ripeness is not tautological. Private military involvement can create a
window of opportunity for negotiations to take place (by creating a MHS, a
necessary condition for ripeness), but this opportunity must be seized by political
actors (Way Out). Ripeness lias been “key to many successful cases of negotiation,
opening the way for discussions that led to an agreement in the Sinai (1974),
Soutliwest Africa (1988), El Salvador (198$), Mozambique (1992), and many
others”°2. The lack of ripeness also led to “the failure of attempts to open
negotiations between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the late 19$Os, within Sudan for
decades, and elsewhere”103. Therefore, one can assume that ripeness is necessary
but not sufficient for the successful initiation and conclusion of negotiations.
102
• William Zartman, “Ripeness” Beyond intractability. eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi
Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium (University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: August
2003), available at. <http:/!www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/> (page consulted
April 2006).
103 I• William Zartman, “Ripeness” Beyond Intractability. eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi
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Despite several drawbacks and hurdies related to the involvement of PMFs,
which will evidently be discussed later, the plausible potential for ripening conflicts
in weak states held by these actors is compelling enough to reward further
examination. However, since this research focuses on just two case studies, it
should just be noted that the conclusions established in this study should flot bear
any general predictive nature on PMFs and their influence on conftict resolution.
The resuits gathered in this study might flot be applicable to every case where
PMFs have been employed.
Burgess. Conflict Research Consortium (University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: August
2003), available at. <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/ripeness/> (page consulted
April 2006).
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CASE STUDY: ANGOLA
Introduction
Analyzing private military intervention in the Angolan civil war by way of
applying William Zartman’ s notion of ripeness proves vital for pointing out the
manipulative’°4 effect a biased Third Party player might have on the resolution of a
given civil war. Iii addition, applying the theory of ripeness to private military
involvement can also partly respond to Jeffrey Rubin’s concern for the need to
continue looldng for ways of creating ripeness in pro-active manners, rather than
simply passively waiting for the ripe moment to present itself’°5. In the following
chapter, we shah seek to uncover whether EO’s intervention in the Angolan
conflict managed to brake out the impasse in negotiations and bring about a MHS,
resulting in the 1994 Lusaka Accords (approximately two years following the 1992
elections). We shall first and foremost briefty go over Angola’s historical
background, then shed light on the nature of Angola’s civil war, and finally make
use of our four indicators (territory, military, economic, political) discussed in
chapter two to test the following hypothesis: in its two year contract between 1992
and 1994, EO contributed to the creation of ripeness by way of generating a MHS.
A briefhistoricaÏ background ofAngola
104 The term manipulative in this context is flot used in a pejorative manner. Quite the opposite, this
term helps in seeking to uncover whether biased third party intervention, in the form of
private military assistance (acting as external manipulators), can help create or expedite the
achievement of negotiated settiements by actively creating a MHS (Mutually Hurting
Seulement), a necessary condition for ripeness. Viewing private military involvement
under this light (redressing the military symmetry to create a military stalemate) can
potentially be a solution to the problem raised by Jeffrey Z. Rubin of passivity embedded in
the ripeness theory. Refer to Chapter Two Ripeness Theory for additional information.
105 Jeffrey Z. Rubin, “The Timing of Ripeness and the Ripeness of Timing”, in
Timing the De-Escatation ofInternational Confticts, eds. Thorson Stuart J., Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 1991.
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Angola is by ail means a country abundantly blessed with natural resources.
Being Africa’s second largest oil producer and possessing an array of exploitable
minerais, Angola has the potential for developing a prosperous
However, three decades of civil war lias among other things prevented its economy
from striving. Extreme poverty is stili a daily reality for 68% of Angolans’°7. The
roots of the Angolan crisis can be found in the country’s brisk period of transition
to independence from Portugal in 1975. The Portuguese settiers, virtually
representing the whoÏe of Angola’s educated population, abruptly deserted the
country, rendering it de-facto desolate and void of a populace trained in statecraft,
industry or agriculture. The new Angolan nation was thus left with littie more than
a “ready supply of warring guerilla armies [...] then, for the better part of the next
quarter-century, the superpowers, their proxies, and white minority governments in
the region stoked the conftict by injecting cash, arms and military
With adolescent government institutions and with inexperienced and unsuitable
personnel running them, the Angolan govemment was ill-equipped for dealing with
upcoming challenges.
Angola’s state of affairs following independence was complicated by
coexisting internai and external factors. Angola was suffering from the
consequences of both inter-state and intra-state confticts, rendering the attainment
of stability very difficult’°9. On the one hand, its inter-state conftict for the most
part involved regional players such as Namibia and South Africa. But as a resuit of
United States (US) Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker’s mediation
efforts and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ (USSR) compliance, Angola’s
inter-state war “was eventually settled in December 1988 by a tripartite agreement,
which provided among other things, for Namibia to move stages to independence
and for the redeployment and disengagement of Cuban troops from Angola” ‘°.
The détente period, which at the time govemed international relations, guaranteed
106 Peter Warren Sinaer, Corporate Warrior, The Risc ofthe Privatied Mititarv Industn, 107.
107 Department for International Development. “Country Profiles: Africa”, availabte at.
<hnp://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africalangola.asp> (Iast updated March 01, 2006, page
consulted April 2006).
108 Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrior, The Rise ofthe Privatied Mititan’ Industrv 107.
‘° I. William Zartman, Ehtsive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, 175.
‘° Ibid.. 175.
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an end to Soviet, Cuban and South African involvement in both Angola and
Namibia”. As early as 1989, a small UN team of military monitors (UNAVEM I)
was stationed across the country in order to observe the progressive withdrawal of
Cuban troops from Angolan territory. The details of this disengagement are
elaborated in the 198$ Brazzaville Accords”2.
Although Angola’s intra-state conflict was strongly interrelated to ils inter
state war, it proved more difficuit to resolve. On top of featuring international
interference, the civil war “had personal, ideological, interethnic, and interregional
dimensions”3. When Angola obtained national independence, two main parties
shaped its unripe and underdeveloped political life: the Movimento Foputar da
Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence
ofAngola (UNiTA). On the one hand, the Soviet Union and Cuba supported the
communist MPLA, a party founded by an educated lefi wing urban elite
concentrated in Luanda (its rural base essentially limited to Kimbundu), and who
had managed to seize the government following independence. They were
perceived by their opponents as asimilado (urban, educated, and Portuguese
oriented), mestizo (mixed race), and northern dominated’ The MPLA’s military
wing, the Forças Annados Angolanos (FAA) consequently constituted Angola’s
state arrny, directed by then General Joao de Matos as Chief of staff. And since the
MPLA held national control over state resources, it thus created Sonogal the
Angolan state ou company in order to generate state revenue115.
On the other hand, UNiTA, which de-facto constituted more of an
insurgency movement, was propped up by the United States and South Africa
during the Cold War. It was founded in Chokwe tenitory in 1966, fine years before
Angola declared independence from Portugal, by Jonas Malheiro Savimbi (1934-
Some organizations such Human Rights Watch however claimed that there was stili backing
under the form of covert assistance and arms trade after 198$.
112 Herbert M. Howe, “Private Security forces and African Stability: the case oflxecutive
Outcomes”, 311.
113 I William Zartman, Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. 175.
Roman Rights Watch, Background, September 1, 1999 Report, “Angola Unravels: The Risc and
of the Lusaka Peace Process”, available at.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/ I 999/angoIaJAngl998-03 .htm#P439_33 $60>
- (page consuhed April 2006).
° Peter Warren Singer, Coiporate Warrior, The Rise ofthe PrivatizedMititan7]ndustn, 107.
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2002), a cuit figure for the faction. Uniike the MPLA, UNflA was rural in
character and had regional roots, primarily among the Ovimbundu people of
southern and central Angola. The structure of its leadership was regionally diverse
and included Cabindans, Bakongo, Lunda-Chokwes, and Nganguelas (etc.)’16.
UNffA’s respective military wing, which held overpoweringly power over
UNffA’s political wing, was the forças Annados de Libertaçao de Angola
(FALA).
The nature ofAngola ‘s civil war
Angola’s civil war thus started as soon as it gained independence from
Portugal in 1975 and pit the MPLA against UNITA. This intra-state war was
complex seeing that it comprised of both conventional and guerilla war aspects.
Further complicating matters was the intervention of multiple third party players
who fueled the conftict with cash, ainmunition, and arms. Not only was Angola
experiencing a proxy war on its own sou (the intervention of the US, South Africa
versus the USSR and Cuba), but was also witnessing the presence of other external
third party players such as private military firms like EO. EO employees, while also
serving in the South African Defense Force (SADF), had for example already
intervened in Angola in the 1980s in order to support UNITA and punish Angolan
support for the rebels fighting against apartheid rule in Namibia and South
Africa117.
Angola’ s first intra-state conflict opposing the MPLA and UNITA
“continued until the year of 1991, when a Portuguese-mediated effort, actively
supported by the United States and the Soviet Union, resulted in the Bicesse
Accords of May 1991” The accords were the result of trilateral talks between
Angola, Cuba and South Africa, and were facilitated by then US Secretary of State
116 Human Rights Watch, Background, September 1, 1999 Report, “Angola Unravels: The Rise and
The Risc and Fali of the Lusaka Peace Process”, available at.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/l 999/angolaJAngl998-03 .htm#P439_33 860>
(page consulted April 2006).
117 Peter Warren Singer, Coiporate Warrioi; The Risc ofthe PrivatizedMilitaiy Industiy, 107-108.
118 William Zartman, Elusive Feace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wa,s, 175.
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Chester Crocker, with the discreet assistance of the USSR. These six rounds of
peace talks were “made possible partly by the ending of the Cold War, which
facilitated US-Soviet cooperation and partly by the desire of the Soviet Union and
Cuba to reduce their financial commitment to Angola”119 The Bicesse Accords
ratified a ceasefire and called for the integration of government and UNITA forces
into the FAA, a 50,000 strong military force’20. The Accords also contained a
Triple Zero clause that stipulated that arms delivery to any Angolan party was
prohibited’21. Under the Accords:
the MPLA remained the legitimate and internationally-recognized
government, retaining responsibility for running the state during the
interim period and for setting the date for elections. A U.N. Angola
Verification Mission (UNAVEM) team of 576 people was
responsible for monitoring during this interim period’22.
hi addition, a Joint Political Military Commission (JPMAC consisted of the MPLA,
UNifA and the three observer nations) would also oversee the transition to
elections after the cease fire had taken effect.
The Bicesse Accords, finally signed by President dos Santos and Savimbi
(following Namibia’s independence and the withdrawal of Cuban combat troops),
did much to relieve Angolans of the shocks of war between June 1991 and early
October 1992. Ultimately, they led to the country’s first national elections, held
September 29-30, 1992123.
first National Elections
119 Human Rights Watch, Background, September 1, 1999 Report, “Angola Unravels: The Risc and
Fail of the Lusaka Peace Process”, available at.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/l999/angolaJAngl998-03 .htm#P439_33 860>
(page consulted April 2006).
120 Ibid.
12! Scan Cleary (1999) “Chapter 8: Angola- A Case Study ofPrivate Military Involvement”, in
Peace, Profit or Plunder? The Privatization ofSecurity in War-Torn African Societies, eds.
Jakide Cilliers and Peggy Mason, Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies, 150.
122 Human Rights Watch, Background, September 1, 1999 Report, “Angola Unravels: The Risc and
Fail of the Lusaka Peace Process”, available at.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/l 999/angolaIAngl998-03 .htm#P439_33 860>
(page consulted April 2006).
123 Scan Cleary (1999) “Chapter 8: Angola- A Case Study of Private Military Involvement”, 145.
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As a resuit of the Bicesse Accords, Angola was awaiting and preparing for
its first electoral experience. Although both the MPLA and UNITA were confident
about the electoral support they could depend on from their respective constituent
ethno-linguistic groups, UNITA decisively lost the elections which counted a
turnout of more than 91 percent (4.4 million) of registered 124 In the
“presidential election, the MPLA’s dos Santos received 49.6 percent of the vote
compared to 40.1 percent cast for UNITA’s Savimbi [...], in the parliamentary
election, the MPLA gathered 53.7 percent of the popular vote versus UNITA’s 34.0
percent”25. Due to the volatile and unpredictable situation, UN Representative
Margaret Anstee intervened and declared the elections fair and free. In addition, the
National Electoral Commission (NEC), UNAVEM and Troika insisted there were
no electoral irregularities’26. The MPLA had indisputably won. Nonetheless,
external assurances did little to queli UNITA. Order proved difficuit to attain
because “Jonas Savimbi refused to accept the outcome of elections held in 1992
under the agreement”27. Soon after the results were officially made public,
Savimbi declared on the VORGAN radio station that lie would no longer tolerate
electoral fraud.
Failing to acknowledge the MPLA’s national authority, Savimbi withdrew
from Luanda claiming bis life in the Angolan capital was in danger, fled to bis
personal bouse in Huambo following bis public declaration on the radio, and
remobilized bis faction’s forces countrywide, hence re-inaugurating another round
of war. The following months witnessed local clashes multiply between UNITA
and members of the paramilitary riot police, into which most members of Angola’s
Special Forces had been transferred into prior to the elections’28.
124 Human Rights Watch, Background, September 1, 1999 Report, “Angola Unravels:
The Risc and Fali of the Lusaka Peace Process”, available at.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/l 999/angoIaJAngl998-03 .htm#P439_33$60>
(page consulted April 2006).
125 j• Andrew Grant, 2001. The End of ‘SavimbiLand’? The Rise and Decline of UNITA ‘s ‘State
Within-a-State’ in Angola (Prepared for the ‘States Within States: Incipient Political
Entities in the Post-Cold War Era’ Workshop at the University ofToronto, 19-20 October
2001). Toronto: University ofloronto, 11.
126 Scan Cleary (1999) “Chapter 8: Angola- A Case Study of Private Military Involvement”, 153.
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In an effort to de-escalate the precariously volatile situation dominating
Angola following the elections, and in order to avoid a national crisis, negotiations
were set up in Luanda the last week of October 1992 between the newly re-instated
government and the UNITA insurgency’29. During the Luanda negotiations, several
parties exchanged proposais on how to end the clashes and restore peace until the
second round of presidential elections could take place. Unfortunately, these
attempts proved insufficient to queil the mounting tension surging between the
MPLA and UNflA. Due to discord over the electoral resuits, Angola’s civil war
resumed approximately one month following the elections and would last until
November y994130
Lack ofa MHS?
This moment of opportunity in Luanda following the month of October
1992 was obviously flot ripe for a negotiated resolution. The lack of a MHS in
1992 could be one factor in explaining the lack of ripeness. It appears as thougli
Savimbi had no interest in negotiating since lie knew the balance of military
capabilities was in bis faction’s favor. UNITA was indeed strong relative to the
MPLA in terms of territorial acquisitions and military capabilities. It “claimed
approximately 80% of the country-its highest ever-including the diamond-rich
north-eastern region”31. Even UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali reported in
December of 1992 that UNifA held 2/3 ofAngola’s municipalities, rendering the
MPLA’s country wide authority near obsolete’32. There was no symmetry in terms
of military power and there was no painful deadlock.
Since UNITA was militarily predominant, Savimbi had bis eye set on
intensifying the conflict until the point of reaching unilateral victory. In a cost
benefit calculation, prolonging the conftict until unilateral victocy wouÏd be more
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beneficial to his faction than negotiating. But Savimbi was flot alone in refusing to
negotiate. If the MPLA had negotiated at that moment of heightened crisis (the
second period of Angoia’s war had already been inaugurated), it would have done it
from a position of extreme weakness. Due to territorial factors, the MPLA had no
leverage over UNITA. The politicai lines drawn on the Angolan map attributing
approximately 80% of the territory to the rebel faction wouid ultimately have
remained frozen, attributing less than 20% to the government133. if the international
community had intervened, both parties knew that “the politicai unes in Angola
would iikely remain drawn where they stood when the ceasefire was
announced”34. The Luanda Talks and Savimbi’s subsequent unilateral ceasefire
thus faiied. In game theoretic terms, Angola’s main players were stili trapped in a
Prisoners Diiemma Game and hence had no incentive to negotiate. A MHS was
what was missing at that juncture. The local power dynamics thus lcd to the
outbreak of Angola’s second civil war which commenced the month of October
1992’.
As early as October (following the September elections), Savimbi launched
a major offensive. Aiready in a better situation relative to the MPLA, UNiTA only
guaranteed an even more secure position for itself with its latest une of attack. The
offensive proved to be very successful since UNITA, beyond what it aiready
controlied, captured most of Angoia’s key oïl facilities and much of the diamond
mining regions’36.
The MPLA had its back against the wail and had little alternatives ieft to
choose from. Since UNITA chose war over negotiation, the MPLA aithough in a
weak and vulnerable position, counterattacked between October 31 and November
02, 1992137. Riot police and other FAA units managed to destroy ail of UNiTA
residences and party offices in Luanda, leading to many deaths and the capture of
most of its miuitary and civilian cadres in the capital. By December of 1992, the
‘ This was in une with what happened later in the year of 1993 when Jonas Savimbi declared a
unilateral ceasefïre.
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MPLA had also managed to cleanse a number of Angola’s main cities from UNITA
supporters. Despite these conquests, which remain modest, the MPLA’s stronghold
remained limited to Angola’s capital. UNITA on the other hand controlÏed most
municipalities outside the capital and more importantly, the rich in natural
resources towns of Uige and Negage138. Thus, despite its efforts, the MPLA alone
could not change the tide of war in order to create a MHS since UNITA was too
strong of an opponent.
Frovoking a MHS via the outsourcing ofEO?
The situation following Angola’s first free elections was such that both
parties chose war over negotiations. They failed to be trapped in a painful military
deadlock and as a resuit, UNITA stiil hoped to lead an attrition war. However, an
important factor came into play in 1993 which would significantly alter Angola’s
civil war: the intervention of an external third party. The MPLA being in a
precarious position vis-à-vis its counterpart decided to outsource EO’s military
services in January of l993’. In order to assess the company’s efficiency, the
Angolan government initially signed a 2 month contract for work in north-western
Angola with EO a South African firm specialized in the supply of military services
“representing the expanded model of the military contractor”140.
The MPLA was first introduced to EO by Tony Buckingham, owner of
Branch-Heritage Oil. EO was a PMF “founded in 1989 by Eben Barlow, a former
assistant commander of the 32nd Battalion of the SADF and then the agent with the
South African Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB)”41. Between 1989 and 1992, EO
was a faithful agent and a loyal ally of the former apartheid state. EO had shown
itself to be an “adaptive miïitary entity that mutates and reincarnates itself when the
political environment changes and when it encounters challenging or hostile
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influences”42. F0 was thus the perfect candidate for managing the MPLA’s needs
since it had the experience and the ability to swiftly organize and deploy an elite
fighting force on short notice. F0 “was not only the most notorious example of a
military provider firm in its purest form, but, as even its most fierce critics admit,
one of the most effective”43. EspeciaÏly in Angola, a country with a comparatively
low military capability, “using ex-SADF personnel had several advantages [...J it
ensured a common training, a pre-existing hierarchy, and extensive combat
experience in low intensity conflict and counter-insurgency
This however was flot Angola’s first experience with a PMF. As mentioned
earlier, E0 itself was previously involved in Angola’s civil conflict, but ironically,
was outsourced by UNITA then still supported by the US and South Africa. As a
resuit of E0’s extensive involvement in Angola’s past affairs, this PMF had gained
an insider’s view of UNITA’s miÏitary strengths and weaknesses. This knowledge
later proved very useful for the MPLA who subsequently outsourced E0 in its
struggle against UNITA.
Since F0 was substantially involved in Angola, we shall try to seek to what
extent E0’s intervention actually had an impact on the country’s civil war? Did E0
help generate ripeness through the crafting of a MHS, resulting in the 1994 Lusaka
Accords? In order to uncover whether E0 did indeed contribute to the creation of a
MHS in its two year contract, we shall draw on our four indicators (territory,
military, economic, and political) discussed earlier in Chapter Two.
EO ‘s impact on territory
In the military sphere, it appears as though the dominant perception among
the political dite ofboth camps at the time ofthe 1994 Lusaka Accords was that a
military stalemate did exist, hence the rational behind their willingness in
negotiating rather than prolonging the war in order to achieve their self-interested
aims. However, this perception seemed absent just two years earlier in 1992 prior
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to EO’ s intervention, hence explaining their reluctance in negotiating. Was there
indeed a iink between EO’s involvement and the MHS that generated the 1994
Lusaka negotiations?
When EO was initiaiiy introduced to the MPLA in 1993, UNITA was
unquestionably in a predominant position in terms of territorial control and
influence. There was indisputably no territorial parity between both rivais. Savimbi
extorted many advantages from his expansion in territorial acquisitions, but his
greatest strategic advantage was the control over the diamond trade, which enabled
him to rebuiid his army into a significant force, as it had been when UNflA
worked in tandem with the South Africans. Given that naturai resources were aiso
an important source of finance for the MPLA, Sonogal the state ou company, and
private ou companies such as Branch-Heritage 0il145, recapturing territory rich in
natural resources from UNITA was one of the MPLA’s first priorities in its bid to
reciaim authority over Angola’46. Accomplishing this would not only aiiow the
MPLA to reinvest much needed revenue into the war effort, but would aiso sever
UNITA’s source of income used for rearmament purposes (etc.). Regaining
territory from UNITA would uitimately heip redress a symmetrical structure for
Angola’s civil war.
EO’s initial contract with the MPLA was fairly limited and straightforward.
Foiiowing UNflA’s capture of Soyo in Mardi 1993, an area rich in petroleum,
EO’s operation consisted of recapturing and defending “vaiuable ou tanks at
Kefekwena and then do the same for the oil town of Soyo, which had been overrun
by the troops of Jonas Savimbi”147. These “specific fields were critical in two ways:
the ou resources were an essentiai government source of finance and the faciiities
in question were owned by Sonogal [...] and Branch-Heritage Ou EO
intervened in the Soyo Operation primariiy as aforce multiplier. Although EO was
up against thousands of UNITA troops already depioyed in the ou region, EO
departed for the Soyo mission with oniy half the numbers of personnel that had
Branch-Heritage Cil was part of the overail business umbrella owned by Tony Buckingham, the
man who personally introduced EO to the MPLA in 1993.
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been requested’49. EO with a unit of merely 80 men150 nonetheless demonstrated its
capabilities during its very first exercise seeing that it reclaimed in only two months
the ou fieids while depioyed. As eariy as May of 1993, the siege was eventually
lifted seeing that UNITA was unabie to dislodge the MPLA then backed by EO.
This joint MPLA/EO effort led to the alliance’s first victory’51.
The Soyo operation undertaken by EO provided the Angolan govemment a
concrete display of the firm’s true combat capabilities. The “importance of the
Soyo battie was that it demonstrated that a private firm couid play an integral foie
in a conflict, by providing military services for bure to the highest bidder”52. The
direct impact EO had on this battie was confirmed by the fact that “as soon as EO’s
men withdrew from Soyo, UNifA retook the facility from the Angolan army [...]
without the PMF, the Angolan government was back to square one”153. The MPLA
single-handedly did flot possess the sufficient capabilities to protect the region from
UNITA troops. It stiil required the assistance and support of an external party.
The capture of the Soyo region was an important territorial seize for the
MPLA seeing that it was an important source of finance. This victory partially and
very temporarily contributed to the creation of a stalemate since it heiped generate
military parity by leveling out UNITA’s and MPLA’s territorial acquisitions. The
Soyo victory without a doubt signaled the beginning of what would soon become a
territorial equiÏibrium between the govemment and its opponent. But since EO’s
involvement in the Soyo mission was very brief, this first triumph alone was
insufficient to make the parties feel trapped in a painful deadlock. It was flot yet a
zero sum game since UNITA stili had an upper hand conceming territorial
dynamics.
Later in 1993, UNITA once more demonstrated its might by having its
troops march on the Angolan capital Luanda. The “primary political objective of
UNITA bas aiways been to gain control over the state capital and rule the country,
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as Savimbi lias aiways fancied”54. This was a huge blow for the government since
Luanda was one of the MPLA’s last strongholds and, as Angola’s capital city, was
the country’s mark for universal diplomatic recognition. It was ail the more crucial
since it generated revenue from some 500,000 banels of ou per day output1’. Yet
again, UNITA confirmed its territorial advantage over its counterpart. Since
UNITA was in a disproportionately strong position vis-à-vis the MPLA and since it
stili had faith in the idea of victory, it was in its best interest to continue fueling the
conflict rather than to negotiate. The situation was flot yet ripe.
Savimbi thus pursued with an aggressive country wide une of attack to
daim more territory. The MPLA had to respond swiftly. With “its ou resources
under threat and its back against the wall, the [MPLA] govemment was [again]
ready to accept outside assistance — especially from forces with firsthand
knowledge on UNITA”56. In light of the “continuing losses suffered by the FAA,
EO was offered a $40 million, one year contract in September 1993 to help train
the state army and direct front-line operations”7. An important deal was stmck
whereby SONANGOL, the state-owned ou entity, would partially finance EO’s
“support operations and, in tum, the project leaders of EO would work closely with
their former enemy, the forças Annados Angolanos (FAA) and its military chef,
General Joao de Matos”8. EO organized and geared up for a more systematic and
comprehensive mission than its previous operations in Soyo. They “recruited more
carefully and establislied a highly successful support operation in Angola that
enabled the FAA government forces to daim a decisive military victory in late
l994159.
With “tactical assistance from Executive Outcomes air assets, that struck
UNflA troop concentrations and launched raids ail over the countryside, the joint
EOIFAA force became the spearhead of a government counter-offensive”60. Using
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“special forces reconnaissance teams and electronic intelligence, EO would locate
UNifA units and headquarters in and around Angola”61. Due to EO’s intervention
and its heavy reliance on diverse sources of intelligence, UNITA became
increasingly exposed since it could no longer retreat to its traditional rural refuge
for resting ground. This proved to be a successful mission since the EO/FAA
coalition regained control over most of Angola’s major cities. EO’s actions drove
UNITA out of its military bases in the northwest and cut its access to arms and
food supplies. The joint EO/FAA operations successfully secured Angola’ s entire
oil region and much of its diamond producing areas. What’s more is that “these
victories solidified the government’s abiÏity to make arms purchases and payments
abroad, key to rebuilding the rest of its army”62. At this juncture, UNITA had
become vuinerable and virtually defenseless as it was cut off from most of its
sources of supply and had no quarters left to retreat to.
EO’s truly decisive triumph occurred only in “lune 1994 when the EO
trained Angolan 16th Brigade triumphed over a strong UNITA force at N’taladonda,
a strategic town outside Luanda”63. N’taladonda was the “newly constituted
brigade’s first battlc; with joint EO-FAA planning it suffered only four
casualties”64. EO personnel helped “recapture the diamond areas of Cafunfo in
mid-luly 1994 and the oil installations at Soyo [once againJ by November, as well
as Uige”65. EO’s successes were unprecedented. At no other time in history had
the FAA been so successful in combating the rebel insurgency. EO’s assistance
helped the MPLA exploit UNITA’s weaknesses on the battlefield and gain an
advantageous edge over the insurgency.
Since EO’s work was irrefutably efficient and central in changing the tides
of war, the MPLA signed a second contract with EO in September of 1994. In an
unrelenting and consistent show of competency, EO subsequently helped the
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MPLA gain control over the strategic town of Huambo’66. Huambo feu to
govemment forces when Savimbi eventually abandoned the city in November of
f994167 UNITA was forced to give up its traditional stronghoid without a fight.
This series of stunning and rapid victories was a huge bÏow to UNffA’s war
effort since it caught Savimbi off guard. The regions reclaimed by the MPLA were
Savimbi’s key financial assets and having to lose them was very costly. It was ail
the more painful since Savimbi was already suffering the ramifications of a UN
imposed arms biockade (applied to UNiTA and lifted on the MPLA)168. The effect
was thus amplified since these regions were one of UNITA’s iast sources of
revenue. Other sources of revenue such as Zaire’s contributions and other channeis
of illicit and covert assistance were becoming insufficient’69. The MPLA, with EO
support, had finally become a worthy opponent.
A comparison between the map of September 170 and the one of
February 1995 171 clearÏy reveals the territorial expansion the MPLA accomplished
during EO’s involvement. Although the areas under UNITA’s control in 1993 were
limited to the south eastern region bordering Zambia and Namibia, the areas of
UNITA’ s operations extended country wide (with the exception of regions
surrounding Luanda and Lubango) and included the strategic regions of Cabinda,
Soyo, N’dalatando and Huambo’72. In contrast, the map of 1995 demonstrates that
the MPLA gained predominant control over much of the territory where UNiTA
had previously held important operations. The MPLA, assisted by EO, had come to
hold controi over the entire coastal region, ranging from Cabinda to the Namibian
border’73. By November 1994, UNiTA’s territorial control was reduced to merely
40 percent of the country, in starch contrast to the 70-$0 percent it controlled prior
to EO’s invoivement.
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But the joint MPLAIEO partnership did more than solely recapture territory
in a random manner. EO had systematically sketched out a comprehensive plan for
recapturing specific targeted areas. The wide-ranging formula of targeting strategic
sites would contribute to the success of the MPLA’s overall war effort. Planned
with much precision, EO’s plan focused on recapturing strategic sites such as ou
and mining regions, key infrastructures (towns with key ports around Soyo,
Cabinda and Luanda etc.), and military bases (dbase UNITA from their military
bases via electronic intelligence and special forces reconnaissance teams).
Aithougli EO largely contributed to the MPLA’s success in many ways, it
however failed to flawlessly guard Angola’s porous borders, a key component in
the Angolan civil war. Although EO had located UNflA units in and around
Angola, and although there are allegations while vehemently denied by EO that the
PMF had personnel deployed in Zaire174, there us stili enougli information to
suggest that UNifA continued to purchase arms and seil diamonds through illicit
trade corridors running into the capital of Kinshasa (etc.)175. Borders should thus
have been an important priority to consider, especially since the UN arms embargo
prevented any neighboring country from selling arms to UNiTA. Despite flot
having secured Angola’s borders, EO stili altered Angola’s map by assisting the
MPLA in taldng control over much of the country’s strategic sites.
The map of 1995 partly points to the symmetrical structure the Angolan
civil war had taken on for the Lusaka Accords. Although the joint EO/FAA effort
did flot manage to annihilate UNITA from ail Angolan territory, it definitely did
manage to thwart UNITA’s plans for a unilateral victory by inhibiting its territorial
predominance and by preventing UNITA from using Angolan territory as a base for
operations against the government. A rough symmetry between the MPLA and
UNITA in terms of territorial acquisitions had undeniably emerged as a result of
EO’s presence.
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EO and miÏitary capabitities
We shah proceed by drawing on our miÏitary indicator in order to further
examine the effect private military intervention had on the development of a MHS
in Angola. In terms of troop morale, UNiTA and the MPLA were certainly flot in a
situation of military parity in the year of 1992. The fact that UNITA continued to
operate for over two decades of resistance confirmed their strength, power,
resihience and morale. Not only did UNITA’s miÏitary wing enjoy up to several
thousand soldiers by 1993 but it also managed to maintain a steady growth176.
Savimbi’s miÏitary faction continued to rapidly expand because he persistently
enÏisted additional recruits into UNiTA’s military ranks from the territorial
expansion lie had recently acquired. At no other time in Angolan history had the
rebel group acquired so much territory in so littie time. Being part of UNITA’s
armed faction represented glory and pride. It also ensured future possibilities and
benefits that the MPLA’s military division could flot offer. UNITA’s military
morale was at its highest. Its resolve persevered even when the US, a particularly
influential ally, stopped providing UNITA with military assistance due to the 1991
Bicesse Accords. This Ïatest development, aithougli significant, did not prove
detrimental to UNITA’s war aims because Savimbi stili managed to rely on
weapons stockpiled prior to the 1991 peace agreement. His faction was stili
equipped with heavy artillery and missile systems, as well as armored vehicles.
Therefore, UNiTA was in a fairly superior position vis-à-vis its counterpart in 1992
in terms of military indicators.
The MPLA was in a very different situation. Government forces were
literally on the verge of defeat in September of 1993’. Military morale was
soaring among the ranks of FAA units. After 20 years of rebel resilience, not only
did Angola’ s military personnel perceive the elimination of UNiTA guerillas as
highly unlikely, they also believed that UNITA had the means to lead an attrition
war. Serving time in the Angolan armed forces had lost its glamour and glitter. It
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became abundantly clear that UNiTA, confident and optimistic, would escalate the
war until attaining unilateral victory if the MPLA and the FAA did nothing to alter
the asymmetrical structure of the war.
However unanticipated and unforeseen, the government managed to alter
the balance in miÏitary power as of mid- 1993. Information and data suggests that
EO had an impact as its arrivai clearly coincided with the exact turning point of the
war. The MPLA, although not predominant, had finaliy become in 1994 a
challenging opponent to UNITA who controlled over 70% to 80% of the country’s
territoryjust two years earlier. EO enhanced the FAA’s raw miiitary capabiiity by
providing sound military and tactical advice, training and logistical supports’78. Ail
things being interrelated, these technical attributes would later contribute to an
increase in FAA morale.
EO was initialiy charged to train the FAA’s newly reestablished 16th
Brigade, a brigade which ironically was virtually destroyed by the SADF’79 in the
19$Os’80. Additional local units trained by EO employed new tactics to strike at
UNiTA troop concentrations. At one of EO’s special operations training bases,
“EO personnel instructed the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) in such fields as
motorized infantry, artillery, engineering, signais, and medical support, as well as
sabotage and reconnaissance”81. As for advising, EO had a strong influence on
FAA troops as well. The PMF “took up an advisory foie with the high command of
the Angolan army to help steer its operations”182. EO advised the Angoian
government on everything from strategies to tactics, thus helping the MPLA sketch
out a comprehensive plan of attack and lay out a clear contingency plan. EO’s plan
“for the campaign was based on weli-practiced counter-insurgency strategies that
had been perfected in Rhodesia, Mozambique, and Namibia”83. EO, with years of
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experience and knowledge in warfare, assisted the MPLA in drawing a clear picture
of UNITA’s strengths and weaknesses.
Aithougli training and advising were two core components of E0’s role, its
tasks were flot restricted to these two features. This PMF also served as a force
multiplier, “a small group whose specialized skills enhance the overail
effectiveness of a much larger force”84. As such, these South African defense
contractors fought alongside the fAA in numerous battles. Although they deployed
“units that are much smalÏer in terms of manpower relative to both their adversaries
and major UN military forces, their ability to project force rests in their high level
of training, experience, and overali battlefield sldll”85. The 16th Brigade, being the
MPLA’s ground force, had E0 personnel “inserted into ail levels of the formation’s
command E0-trained “soldiers proved instrumental in seizing
N’taladonda, and F0 personnel helped recapture the diamond areas of Cafunfo in
mid-July 1994 and the oïl installations at Soyo by November, as well as Uige”87.
E0’s contribution was so successful due to the fact that they exploited UNITA’s
weaknesses by employing previously unseen tactics in the Angolan theatre of war.
These included “night fighting, joint air-land assaults, and long-range strike
missions”188. With little experience in these new styles of warfare and with littie or
no set protocol for these missions, UNifA was extremely powerless.
The E0/MPLA partnership prevailed thanks to severai factors but two
military capabilities in particular contributed to their success: discipline and
mobility. These two features would be their greatest assets. F0 had better quality
personnel and the fact that F0 personnel directly intervened alongside the FAA on
the field did indeed alter the FAA’s military capabilities. F0 defense contractors
were “handpicked from a pool of highly trained combat veterans, an especially
large pool since post-Cold War demobilizations”89. A significant number of them
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came from “very professional Western units [and proven South African combat
specialists] in which political responsibility and military capabilities are cardinal
principles”90. EO employed soldiers from three of the most elite units of the
“Apartheid-era South African Defense Forces (SADF) [...J most were drawn from
the disbanded 32’ Battalion”9’. EO personnel’92 exploited the military capabilities
they had gained during their military careers to prop up the existing authority in
Angola. PMF researcher A.J. Venter notes that any defense contractor who
“stepped out of une was put on the next plane back home, policy that reflected the
reality of there was little room for mistakes when attempting to compel 3 8,000
active duty UNITA personnel to stop fighting”93. UN1TA was thus pitted against
a professional fighting force and had to compete against the military capabilities of
elite fighting units.
EO also had better quality combat equipment. Iii terms of mobility, EO had
prepared for the MPLA to have at their disposai ail the material needed to
effectively battle UNITA. EO combat units focused on a classic campaign of find,
fix and destroy’94. They benefited from a pan-African communication network
which enabied them to circumvent logistical hurdies inherent in conducting
military operations in Africa’95. Aircraft for transferring personnel and supplies and
an established procurement infrastructure for dispensing equipment and
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consumables were readily available196. EO focused on buying aircraft for the
upcoming operations. Its acquisitions included “Mi-24 Hind-D helicopters gunships
purchased from the Ukraine, Ml-17 Hip medium transport helicopters, MIG-23
fighter jets, L-39 propeller-driven ground-attack aircraft, and even two Boeing 727s
for logistics shipments”97. Everyone of their men:
was mounted, allowing them to move very quickly and appear
anywhere on the battlefield while the enemies were forced to march
on foot. For £0, its aircraft would accomplisli the same aim. Whule
UNifA was forced to march for days in the bush, E0 could cover
the same distance in minutes. E0-led squads would [also] appear at
the points with superior weapons and discipline. Together, these
features would make E0 unbeatable’98.
Much of EO’s success has indeed been attributed to the “PMC’s surprise long-
range helicopter assaults deep within UNITA controlled territory supported by
ground attack aircraft and armored ground vehicles”99. These equiprnent purchases
allowed £0 to conduct extrernely mobile attacks and to deploy rapidly in any
region of Angola. EO’ s involvement, in terms of training, advising and combating,
thus positively helped boost the FAA’s military morale while acquiring more
tenitory and control in Angola.
The information above definitely sheds light on the extent that £0 helped in
altering the balance in military capabilities. Defense “strategists generally credit
E0 with greatly assisting the MPLA to turn back the resurgent UNiT A”200. There
are even UNITA combatants who addressed the issue ofEO’s interference. During
the conflict with EO, one UNiTA soldier even stated:
We used to know we could sleep well at night. In this recent war,
new tactics meant that fightïng continued at night and that light
infantry units led by these Executive Outcornes guys would corne
deep behind our unes. We could no longer rest. It weakened us very
196 Khareen Pech (1999) “Chapter 5: Executive Outcomes-A Corporate Conquest”, 89.
197 James R. Davis, Fortune’s Warriors: Privote Armies and tue New World Order, 128.
198 Ibid., [29.
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200 Elizabeth Rubin, “An Army ofTheir Own”, Harper’s. February 1997, 45 as cited in Herbert M.
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Rienner, 2001), 199.
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much. It is the new tactics in which they trained the FAA [...J that
made the difference. They introduced a new style of warfare in
Angola. We are not used to this201.
Some even daim that EO performed a peace-enforcing function in Angola by
enhancing the military capability of one camp in order to alter the military tide of
the conflict202. Indeed, a realist perspective of conflict management theory would
point to “empirical evidence that suggests that the majority of intra-state conflicts
have been resolved by force
EO once again helped in partially redressing the symmetrical structure of
the war by creating military parity between the warring sides. Savimbi’s drive to
win a final victory was fading204. The boost in FAA morale and the increase in
UNiTA casualties led each of the parties to sign the Lusaka Protocols, which at that
point in time ended Angola’s protracted civil war. A formerly ignored peace accord
had finally been approved and signed as a result of EO’s intervention. The
“subsequent elections in Angola could also be considered a direct resuit of the
successful military campaign EO had led”205. Hence, propping up the MPLA’s
military capabilities partially contributed to altering the balance in military power
in Angola.
EO and economic costs
We shall now consider the effect EO had on the war’s economic dynamics.
As stated previously, UNITA was by and large in a predominant position vis-à-vis
its counterpart in 1992. However, two consistent years of war escalation between
1992 and 1994 gravely affected UNITA’s economic resources, hence rendering its
201 Human Rights Watch, “Between War and Peace: Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses since
the Lusaka Protocol” (New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1996), 10, available at.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996!Angola.htm> (accessed on January 13, 2004) as cited in
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war effort increasingly difficuit to sustain. Although the financial repercussions
were very costly for the MPLA, it cannot be said that the escalation of war which
took place during EO’s involvement was inconsequential for UNiTA. It is true that
the mere survival of a rebel insurgency, in this case for over 20 years, is often
viewed as a victory in itself206. The faction’s resilience is confirmed by UNffA’s
abiÏity in undermining state authority for such a long period of time and by
UNITA’s success in acquiring 80% of Angola’s territory by 1992. However, the
pace and intensity of EO’s successes and concrete accomplishments injust two
years put the mere future and survival of UNITA into question.
UNiTA came to suffer hard blows following EO’s involvement. Logically,
UNflA’s survival was closely linked to its economic lifeline, and its economic
lifeline was closely linked to the territory it possessed. During the two years of EO
involvement, Savimbi’s faction lost most of its newly acquired territory and as a
resuit the revenue that could be extracted from it. EO had blocked UNITA’s access
to most of these areas. The loss of the regions of N’dalatondo, Cabinda, Soyo and
Huambo were particularly huge blows to UNITA’s revenue not onïy because they
represented a colossal source of income but more importantly, because they
represented one of UNITA’s last sources of revenue, hence rendering them vital for
the survival of UNflA207. Savimbi’s faction was exceptionally dependent on
Angola’s natural resources for revenue since the UN had lifted sanctions on the
MPLA and flot on UNITA (the UN Security Council banned the sale of weapons
O8and petroleum to UNITA under Resolution 864 on 15 September 1993)- . UNITA
had very little alternatives left. It was thus forced to almost exclusively rely on
Zaire’s illicit trade routes for restocldng and rearmament purposes, which after a
while became inadequate for UNITA’s war effort, even for maintaining a basic
206 Henry A. Kissinger, “The Viet Nam Negotiations”, Foreign Affairs 47 (no. 2) (January 1969),
214 as cited in I. William Zartman, Elusive Peace. Negotiating an End to Civil Wars
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level of administration and infrastructure. Zaire’s contributions alone had become
insufficient for sustaining UNITA’s war effort209. Although figures on UNITA’s
economic standing are flot provided due to methodological problems associated
with the study of rebel movements210, it is stili evident that EO had indeed severed
UNITA’s economic base. This de facto propped up the MPLA.
The gap in power and supremacy between UNITA and the MPLA was
incrementalïy diminishing as UNITA came to suffer from economic breakdown.
However, the two years of war escalation which allowed the MPLA to reach rough
parity with its counterpart came at a high price for the govemment as well. The
intensification of the conflict between 1992 and 1994 proved very costly for the
MPLA who witnessed among other things Angola’s economy plunder.
If one takes figures of Angola’s GDP ($ million), one notices a fall from
1992 to 1994, the most intense years of Angola’s civil war, which coincide with
EO’s involvement. While in 1991 the country’s GDP was at 12 127, it fell to $ 702
in 1992, then to 6 645 in 1993 to finally 4 706 in y994211 Moreover, Angola’s
external debt (% of GDP and which includes some oil company debt) more than
doubled in just two years. h 1991, the extemal debt was at 67,3, thenjumped to
106,1 in 1992, then to 149,7 in 1993, to finally 233,8 in 1994212. Furthermore, the
composition of government spending (% of GDP) had also been modified. Whule
govemment defense spending was at 8% in 1991, it fell to 6% in 1992, only to
climb back to 15% in 1993 to then skyrocket to 20% in 1994213. The government’s
new spending priorities clearly had an impact on Angola’s gross domestic savings
since they feu from 18% of Angola’s GDP in 1991, to 13% in 1992 to finally an
209 James R. Davis, fortune’s Warriors: Private Armies and the New World Order, 130.
210 The “nature of the activities raises special methodological problems that account, in part, for the
relative dearth of empiricai studies. Connections to the criminal ‘underworld’ shroud war
economies in a secrecy that hinders efforts to obtain tangible evidence of theoreticai
daims. The context of civil wars, with the attending disruption of normal life, makes data
collection arduous and research in the field hazardous”. Refer notably to Marie-JodIle
Zahar, “Is Ail the News Bad News for Peace? Economic agendas in the Lebanese civil
war” International Journal, Winter 2000-2001, 116.
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ail-time low of 10% in 1994214. And on top ofit ail, EO’s contract itself was worth
US $40M a year, costing the MPLA a total sum of US $60M for its services215.
Therefore, the period between 1992 and 1994 was very costly for the government
as well in terms of economic figures.
However, putting these figures in context nonetheless helps to highiight the
efficient nature of EO’s engagement. While EO’s price tag may seem an
“extravagant expense at first glance, it must be noted that the United Nations was
spending roughiy $lmiliion a day to maintain its UNAVEM II observer force in
Angola at the same time”216. Besides, haif of EO’s fees were intended for arms
purchases which later proved very useful for the MPLA while the other haif was
intended for EO expenses217. The MPLA purchased tanks, armed personnel
carriers, and other heavy weaponry to enable the FAA to attack UNITA
installations. For the MPLA, “it was money weii spent because EO helped to hait
UNffA’s military drive”218. Aithough EO’s intervention did come at a high price
(the effect the intensification of the war had on the Angolan economy), it did
indeed aliow the government to re-appropriate territories rich in naturai resources,
and hence contributed to changing the tide of war. EO’s fee was smali relative to
the revenue the MPLA couid extract from areas such as the Soyo region. As some
say, the war effort cost the government the next three to seven years of earnings
from ou to its industry. This however is minute considering the fact that the
government was on the verge of total defeat prior to EO’s arrivai, and risked iosing
ail of its ou assets prior to EO intervention.
Ail we have said sheds light on the fact that although not quite in equal
manners, the war was costly for both the MPLA and UNifA. However, EO and the
resuiting escalation of the war particuiariy severed UNITA’s economic base, thus
propping up the MPLA. A staiemate, painful to both the MPLA and UNiTA, had
indeed deveioped and was in part due to economic factors.
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EO and potiticat costs
We shah now examine the effect EO had in Angola by considering the
politicai factors that contributed to the creation of a stalemate. Tri terms of political
power, the MPLA and UNITA were obviously not in similar situations in 1992 due
to their poÏiticai status. Whule the MPLA had legitimate authority over Angola due
to international recognition subsequent to the 1992 elections, UNITA had no
officiai standing since it was considered a resistance movement. However, as is
often the case with rebel movements, the sheer existence of UNITA clearly
iiiustrated the government’s political inability on the ground. This rendered it
difficult for the MPLA to consolidate its power across ail regions of Angola.
UNITA enjoyed significant support from numerous regions and ethnic tics,
including that of Angola’s iargest ethnic group, the Ovimbundu219.
While the MPLA regime, being Angola’s sovereign government, enjoyed
j udicial recognition, UNITA successfuily:
carved out and administered an ever-changing portion of the country
refened to by some as ‘Savimbiland’. Savimbiland, of course, is not
ajuridicai state, but it is consistent with Spears’ definition of a state
within-a-state in which UNITA lias demonstrated, to varying
degrees, the extension of force, tenitory, national identity, and
internai iegitimacy, capacity to generate revenue and.
administration and infrastructure220.
Savimbiland began as a “smali section of territory in the far south-eastern corner of
the country surrounding the UNITA’s base camp in Jamba and grew to
“1
approximately 70 to 80 percent of the country’s land mass in the early 1990s”
Uniike the aims of certain insurgencies in other civil wars, UNITA neyer
envisioned or aspired to create Savimbiland as an independent state. It was neyer
estabiished in the hopes of being converted into a separate or autonomous state222.
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Savimbi’s aim was flot secession, for the creation of a separate state on southern
Angola “would have left him with little more than a great, barren tract of bush [...J
rather, bis intention was to ensure that his adversaries could neyer forget bis
demand to enter the kraal in Luanda in triumph”223. With such a defiant
temperament and with such extensive regional influence, Savimbi was definitely a
considerable challenge to the MPLA’s national authority. Although UNITA did flot
benefit from international recognition, it stili did possess local authority and
support within Savimbiland, civilian support often being a key component in
waging and winning a war.
As has been demonstrated, Savimbi, and de facto Savimbiland, generated
“revenues in order to sustain UNITA’s war efforts, ranging from patron states to
internai sources in the form of taxation to lucrative proceeds from diamond
exports”224. These sources of revenue have enabled “UNifA to establish a basic
level of administration and infrastructure within Savimbiland, such as hospitais,
schools, airstrips, a radio station, a newspaper, and farms”225. UNITA’s investment
in Savimbiland’s infrastructures secured Savimbi local civilian support. The fact
that the head of UNiTA reinvested assets into local communities ensured mass
support for the cult leader and bis war against the Angolan government who failed
to provide basic services to pockets of Angola’s populace. However, as established
earlier, UNITA had corne to lose much ofit sources of revenue at the time ofEO’s
intervention. The combination of UN sanctions and the loss of territory rich in
natural resources gravely hindered UNITA’s war efforts. No longer having the
means to reinvest assets in Savimbiland, UNiTA grew increasingly desperate and
turned to other methods for survival. These latter means, often brutal, inevitably
came to the detriment of local support.
Even though Savimbi’s track record for human rights was neyer very good,
a shift from old guerilla warfare to terror tactics was noticeable in the years of war
223 Grant, I. Andrew, 2001. The End of ‘SavimbiLand’? The Rise and Dectine of UNITA ‘s ‘State
Within-a-State’ in Angola, 2-3 as cited in lan Spears, “States Within States: Incipient
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Within States Workshop at the University ofToronto, (19-20 October 2001), 5.
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escalation from 1992 to y993226 Due to EO’s intervention which hampered
UNffA’s source of income, the rebel faction was forced to start looting, among
other things, for survival (seizing arms, food, etc.). Due to military and logistics
reasons, UNffA’s military units started to act in a more purely terrorist manner.
Having lost much of its territorial assets to the MPLA, UNITA had to steal to
survive.
Many of UNflA’s brutal attacks on unarmed peasants and humanitarian
relief workers have been carefully documented by human rights organizations and
reporters such as New York Times’ Kenneth Noble227. Even Fred Bridgland228, a
conservative British journalist who wrote a rather sympathetic biography of
Savimbi and who had until 1989 been a staunch supporter of UNifA, stated that
Savimbi had committed several human rights abuses229. For example, while
battiing to capture the second city, Huambo, UNITA shelled the area and a medical
delegation sponsored by the United Church of Christ’s for racial justice, despite a
majority of its residents having granted support for UNifA during the elections230.
The town finally feli to rebels, at a cost of many civilian casualties. This act of
terror, especially having been conducted in a town where traditional support was
relatively strong, gravely damaged UNflA’s image amongst civilians.
There were also frequent reports of violations of the laws of war, including
executions of captured soldiers and cases of chuidren forced to fight on the war
front231. UNflA is responsible for gross human rights abuses, including executions
226 Human Rights Watch, Background, September 1, 1999 Report, “Angola Unravels:
The Risc and Fail of the Lusaka Peace Process”, available at.
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of civilians and other deliberate and arbitrary killings. A major event which
received much public attention occurred near Quipungo (Huila), when UNITA
attacked a train on May 27, 1993 in which hundreds of people were ldlled and
several hundred injured. Many landrnines have also been deliberately planted on
Angolan terrain, destroying agriculture and crops and forcing Angolan civilians to
flee their homes232.
But civilians were flot UNITA’s only targets. Humanitarian efforts were
also hampered by the war. Several relief flights were hit by UNITA fire. hi April
1993, a World Food Program aircraft was shot down by UNITA in eastern Angola.
UNifA attempted to deny the delivery of food aid to isolated government towns in
order to capture the food supplies for its own men. Frequent suspensions of relief
flights were the norm because of UNITA attacks. Moreover, frequent kidnappings
and unlawful arrests were common, just like Aifredo Afonso, a UN World Food
Program official based in Huambo, was arrested by UNifA in July 1994233. These
tactics of intimidation cost UNITA significant local civilian support. A popular
Angolan slogan which was posted country wide was self explanatory: “The MPLA
steals, UNITA idils”. UNITA could no longer depend on civilian support as it
previously could. These means would corne to cost them dearly in terms of political
support.
But UNITA was not the only one suffering from the political costs of war
between 1992 and 1994. The government experienced painful political
ramifications as the war inflicted major political costs on the MPLA during EO’s
involvement. The story for the governrnent was however very different since the
MPLA was officially in charge of the country ever since Angola declared
independence from Portugal in 1975. With UNITA on a major une of attack and
April 2006) and Human Rights Watch, January 01, 1996, “Children in Combat”, available
at.
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/c/crd/genera1961.pdf (page consulted February 2006).
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with the involvement of a private military firm, the conflict rapidly intensified to
previously unseen levels. Between October of 1992 and November of 1994, there
were more dead Angolans than in the 16 years of conflict prior to 1991. It is
estimated that:
300,000 Angolans-3 percent of the population, died in the fighting
probably more than in the preceding sixteen years of war. The UN
reported that as many as 1,000 people were dying daily from May to
October 1993 from the conftict, starvation, and disease-more than in
any other conflict in the world at the time234.
Fighting was particularly fierce in the last two months of the war, when tens of
thousands of civilians were said to have been killed. Thousands of Angolans, many
of them women and chiidren, died in the besieged cities of Kuito and Huambo and
in rural areas. Some died of hunger, some were ldlled in cross-fire, some were
blown up by land-mines. Both the government and UNiTA shelled and bombed
predominantly civilian areas, idiling thousands. In Kuito alone, a city almost totally
destroyed by bombing, tens of thousands of people are said to have died during an
18-month siege by UNITA. Both parties blatantly disregarded international
humanitarian law and explicitly used food aid as a weapon. Humanitarian aid
agencies were attacked by both sides and both the government and UNITA
prevented delivery of food to areas controlled by the other side235.
AÏthough it was UNITA who reinstated the war because of its failure to
accept the 1992 electoral results, and although the MPLA only outsourced EO’s
services when it found itself in a position of extreme weakness, the government
was stiil criticized for having employed a PMF making use of more sophisticated
and lethal arms. Many blamed much of the war’s detrimental effects, such as the
amount of civilian loss, on the use of these new lethal weapons, imported by the
FAA under the advisement of EO. The war had dire consequences on civilian life.
The number of displaced individuals had speedily increased by lune 1993.
Commercial food imports into Luanda nearly came to a standstill due to the lack of
234 Human Rights Watch, “Angola: Between War and Peace-arms trade and human rights abuses
since the Lusaka Protocal”, Refitgee Sttrvey Quarterty 15 (no. 2), (February 1996), 37.
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foreign exchange, forcing the government to spend money on armaments. A UN
World Food Program report suggested that an important proportion of Angola’s
harvest would rot due to disruption caused by the figliting, and estimated that 1.9
million conflict-and drought-affected individuals would need 337,000 tons of food
assistance236. The MPLA was thus perceived as weak since it was unable to ensure
security to Angola’s population. The MPLA, although stronger than prior to EO’s
intervention, was stili bearing the consequences of the war escalation. The
successes of the MPLA could be directly attributed to EO’s involvement237.
Aithougli both the MPLA and UNiTA were in a situation of rough parity, they
were both bearing the political costs associated with the war. They had reached a
painful deadlock, a situation no longer viable for eitlier of them.
Conclusion
After having studied the case of Angola, it is now abundantiy clear that
there was indeed a MHS in 1994 which subsequently led to the Lusaka Accords. in
Angola 1994, there was rough parity between both opponents, both were moving
toward equality, and both found themselves in a painful deadlock. These statements
have been demonstrated via the use of our four indicators. The four indicators used
for the purpose of the Angolan case study are clearly interrelated and are ah
involved in a dynamic interaction. For example, it is clear that a loss in territory
obviously lias repercussions on economic indicators, and vice versa. The
modifications witnessed in all four indicators have jointly contributed to a
stalemate whereby Angola’s civil war took on a symmetrical structure in 1994. The
MHS was obviously the combined impact on ail four levels: territory, miiitary,
economy, and politics.
h is also abundantly clear that EO had a significant role, albeit not
exclusive, in the creation of the MHS. Many experts of the Angolan civil war
236 Ibid.
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directly attribute the MPLA’s success to EO’s involvement238. Therefore, the
hypothesis asserting that EO contributed to the creation of ripeness by way of
generating a MHS in its two year contract between 1992 and 1994 has been
confirmed.
Whule UNITA was in a predominantly superior position in 1992 in terms of
territorial acquisitions, military capabilities, economic sources of finance, and
political leverage, the situation quicldy changed subsequent to EO’s intervention.
EO, outsourced by the MPLA, succeeded in altering the balance ofpower. By
exploiting UNITA’s weaknesses, EO managed to recapture most of UNITA’s
territorial acquisitions, managed to surpass UNITA’s military capabilities by using
innovative strategies and tactics, managed to sever UNITA’s source of income, and
finally, managed to inflict political costs maldng civilians turn against UNITA.
Savimbi’s faction was no longer disproportionately strong vis-à-vis the MPLA.
Thanks to the government’s partnership with EO, the MPLA, much stronger, was
able to defend itself and retaliate against its opponent. However, even with EO’s
assistance, the MPLA stili did not foresee a rapid defeat of UNITA as likely. The
government knew that it could flot rapidly or fully defeat the opposition, hence
maldng negotiations more attractive (given the costs which induced war weariness).
There no longer appeared to be any predominant player in the Angolan civil war.
After two years of rapid and intense escalation, the conflict appeared to
reach a plateau whereby both players were trapped in a painful deadlock. Both
parties had thus reached a painful impasse by 1994 whereby neither side could win.
By redressing the conflict’s symmetrical structure, EO helped create a MHS. This
MHS hence led to a ripe moment when the Lusaka Accords took place. The fact
that neither side predominated on the battlefield created a stalemate that stimulated
Angola’s warring sides to seek a negotiated settiement.
By late 1994, military advances by the government forced UNITA to lose
leverage and make significant concessions in the Lusaka peace talks (accept
238 Human Rights Watch, “Angola: Between War and Peace-arms trade and human rights abuses
since the Lusaka Protocal”, 53.
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proposais for nationai reconciiiation). UNiTA hence piedged to sign the protocol in
order to hait the government’s newiy witnessed military gains. The Lusaka
Protocoi was initialed by the Angolan government and UNITA on October 31,
1994. The joint MPLAJEO operation was indeed successfui and decisive in the
course of the civil war since UNiTA rebels, “beaten back and stunned by the new
tactics, which included deep penetrations air-ground assauits and night attacks
neyer used before in the conflict, agreed to a peace accord in Lusaka in November
1994239. And in a “seeming recognition of EO’s effectiveness, UNITA made a
condition to its signature: that the company ieave the country”240.
Nevertheless, the Lusaka Accords failed to provide long term peace as
fighting was renewed months later. indeed, the Lusaka Accords did flot
permanently hait the war. However, one must bear in mmd that the point of
obtaining a MHS is to create ripeness for political players to attempt to resolve a
conflict in a comprehensive manner. Since the Ripeness Theory is flot tautological,
a MHS can guarantee the initiation of negotiations, not the success of negotiations.
And this is exactly what EO accomplished. EO’s mandate (military, strategic, and
tactical) did not consist of permanently resolving the conflict. EO altered the
military balance, created a MHS and made possible the initiation of negotiations.
Achieving a MHS is important because it is a necessary and fundamental
component (but not sufficient) for the permanent resolution of a conflict.
Therefore, the lack of permanent peace hence does not negate the fact that
EO contributed to the creation of a MHS and that this MHS created ripeness,
resulting in the 1994 Lusaka Accords. These conclusions do however provoke
foÏlow up questions. Since EO did in fact create a MHS which led to the 1994
Accords, what was then missing for these accords to be successful and ensure long
term stability? Was the lack of peace a variable of EO’s stay? In other words, if BO
had remained in the country for a longer period of time after both sides had joined
the negotiation table, would a permanent resolution of the conflict have
239 Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warriors. The Rise oJthe Privatized Mititaly Indust,y, 109.
240 Ibid.
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transpired241? Having successfully fulfiÏled its military mandate, how could EO
have further assisted post-MHS political efforts in creating lasting peace? Did EO’s
intervention create unintended consequences in Angolan politics, such as the
intervention of new players? Can a PMF alter the symmetry and generate a MHS in
intra-state wars involving more than two main belligerents? It is evident that more
research bas to be done on this issue. However, this case study bas proven that an
external and biased third party can have an important impact for creating a MHS,
hence contributing to a ripe moment.
241 There may be a need frr stay behind companies.
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CASE STUDY: SIERRA LEONE
Introduction
In this chapter, we shah seek to uncover whether EO’s intervention in the
Sierra Leone conflict managed to break out the impasse in negotiations and bring
about a MHS, resulting in the 1996 Abidjan Accords (only ten months after Sierra
Leone’s first multiparty elections). We shah first and foremost briefly go over
Sierra Leone’s historical background, consisting of years of war between the
internationally recognized government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
rebels. We shah then shed light on the nature of the country’s civil war and the
ensuing Abidjan Accords (the internationahly negotiated and enforced political
settiement). FinaÏly, we wihl make use of our four indicators discussed earlier in
Chapter Two to test the following hypothesis: in its two year contract between 1995
and 1997, EO contributed to the creation of ripeness by way of generating a MHS.
A briefhistoricaÏ bctckground of Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone is a country blessed with a diversity of natural resources.
Especially abundant in diamonds, bauxite, and gold, Sierra Leone bas had
opportunities for developing its national economy via the exploitation of its natural
resources. Certain scholars such as Peter Singer have even stated that Sierra Leone
should be one of Africa’s richest states since it is “endowed with vast amounts of
the highest-grade diamonds in the world, in-ground kimberlites”242. Sierra Leone is
blessed with huge potential wealth in the form of vast “minerai deposits, yet is
struggiing to use these riches for the benefit of the majority of the population
- the
country is rated 176 of 177 countries in the 2005 UN Human Development
242 Marina Jimenez, “Canadians Seek Fortune in Land of Anarchy . Violence”, The National Post
(Canada), Augus 23, 1999 as cited in Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrior, The Rise
ofthe Privatized Mititaiy Industrv (New York: Corneli University Press, 2003), 1 10.
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Index”243. By the 1990s economic activity was waning and “economic
infrastructure had become seriously degraded [...] over the next decade much of
Sierra Leone’s formai economy was destroyed in the country’s civil war”244.
Hence, over a decade of brutal civil strife lias prevented Sierra Leone from
prospering.
The origins of Sierra Leone’s conflict are manifold and include historical,
military, economic, geographical, and political facets. Sierra Leone gained
independence in 1961 from the British who handed the country’ s administration to
the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), headed at the time by Milton Margai245.
Sierra Leone’s troubled contemporary past started with “Siaka Stevens breaking
from the SLPP and forming the Ah Peoples Congress (APC), winning a contested
and controversial election victory in 1967246. Following a brief speil of military
government, the army restored civilian power in 196$, with Siaka Stevens and the
APC assuming control under the form of a one-party ldeptocracy247. Stevens’s
power was further strengthened in 197$ when a referendum rendered the APC
Sierra Leone’s only legal party. Benefiting from the advantages derived from
rampant corrupt governance and recognizing how vuinerable lis political authority
was, Stevens intentionally weakened the military in order to prevent eventual
coups. The populace was thus left with nothing more than a corrupt government
and an underdeveloped economy. Neither “Stevens nor his handpicked successor,
General Joseph Saidu Momoh [who took power in 19$6], managed to stem the
continued downward spiral of the economy”248. Mismanagement and corruption,
especially in the diamond industry, were significant factors behind Sierra Leone’s
underdevelopment. However, a 1991 referendum gave the country’ s populace a
213 Department for International Development (DFID), “Country Profiles: Africa”, available at.
<http ://www.dfid.gov.uklcountries/africalsierraleone.asp> (last updated March 24, 2006,
page consulted April 2006).
244 Ibid.
245 lan Douglas (1999) “Chapter 9: Figliting for Diamonds
- Private Military Companies in Sierra
Leone”, in Peace, Profit or Plunder? Tise Privatization ofSecurity in War-Torn African
Societies, eds. Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason, Johannesburg: Institute for Security
Studies, 175.
246 Ibid., 175.
247 Ibid., 175.
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glimnier of hope seeing that it provided for a new constitution sanctioning a
muitiparty democracy.
Despite mounting optimism, Sierra Leone’s problems only worsened in the
1990s. The country’s troubles originated from both internai and external factors:
internai popular dissatisfaction with Sierra Leone’s post-independence governance,
and external regional conflicts spreading across borders. Bordering Guinea and
Liberia, Sierra Leone was unfortunately often drawn into the political affairs of its
neighboring states, and vice-versa. Liberia, under the control of Charles Tayior,
proved to be especially probiematic for the stability of Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone’s
civil conflict only really began though in March of 1991 when the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF), lcd by Corporal Foday Sankoh, crossed over the Liberian
border and iaunched a rebellion against President Momoh249.
This attack was both planned and executed from Liberia with considerable
assistance from Charles Taylor, former warlord who subsequently became
President of Liberia. Taylor, who had met Sankoh in guerilla training grounds in
Benghazi Libya in the 1980s, indirectly and personaiiy waged and organized
attacks against the Sierra Leone government who had allowed the Nigerian-ied
ECOMOG intervention force to use Freetown as a base during its exercise in
Liberia250. Taylor, whose bid for power was affected by the ECOMOG force (the
government provided logistical backing to ECOMOG in its effort to defeat
Taylor)251, wished to “impair Freetown’s ability to assist the military effort of
BCOMOG in Liberia”252. In retribution for Sierra Leone’s assistance to the
Nigerian-ied ECOMOG, Taylor aided lis old contact Sankoh in destabilizing Sierra
Leone by supplying the RUF with arms and ammunition.
Prior to Sankoh’s arrivai at its head, the RUF was a group of exiled,
alienated, and estranged students contesting Steven’s corrupt and incompetent
249 David Shearer, Private Armies and Militai-y Interventions, 49.
250 Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrioi; The Rise ofthe Privatized Mulitaiy Indnstiy, 111.
251 Human Rights Watch, Backgrounders, “Charles Taylor and the wars in Liberia and Sierra
Leone”, available at.
<http://hrw.org/eng1ishJdocs/2006/03/29/1iberi13103.htm> copyright 2006 (page consulted
April 2006).
252 lan Douglas (1999) “Chapter 9: Figliting for Diamonds - Private Military Companies in Sierra
Leone”, 177.
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rule . But when Sankoh joined its ranks, he took over the military wing and cast
out the politicaliy minded individuals. The rebel movement would soon start
waging particuiarly violent and brutal attacks on the Sierra Leone populace,
exploiting the country’s political cleavages “between town and country, and
between the repatriated-slave elite and indigenous people”254. The RUF, which
primarily appealed to the country’s dispossessed, was reiatively successful in its
war against Sierra Leone’s government, and used drastic measures to achieve its
goals, regulariy exercising brutal methods such as the amputation of limbs, the
decapitation of leaders, and the abduction of child soldiers and sex slaves255.
Not only was the RUF’s mission sustained by Taylor’s support, it was also
fuelled by the government’s feeble and incompetent military, which ironicaliy had
purposefully been weakened by the Sierra Leone government for fear of an
eventual coup. The “army had been largely ceremonial, completely unprofessional,
and recruited from among the same alienated youths as the RUF”256. As a resuit,
Sierra Leone’s government failed to defend itseif against the advances of the RUF
and was unable to hait its territorial expansion. In essence, the “government’s
ability to resist the RUF was undermined by its very corrupt nature”257.
The RUF was unquestionabiy in a superior position vis-à-vis the
government at this point in time. By the end of 1991, Sierra Leone’s “token army
was becoming demoralized”258. On top of being incapable of defeating the threat
posed by the rebels, “President Momoh didn’t appear to trust them [...] as morale
sank, some army units began going over to the RUF [...] by early 1992, the Sierra
Leonean army was broken and the rebeis were approaching the capital”259. Due to
the RUF’s triumphs and rapid territorial expansion, a change in public policy
regarding the new rebel tbreat was crucial. Defense poiicies embracing the status
quo were no longer a viable option.
253 Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrior The Rise ofthe Privatized Militaiy Industiy, 111.
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Adjustments would have to be executed in an unconventional manner and it
would be up to a man by the name of Valentine Strasser to finaiiy give way to this
change. Momoh the amiable but ineffectual leader26° was finally ousted in April
1992 when army officiais headed by Corporal Strasser entered lis office and
demanded assistance for the armed forces261. Anticipating a coup and fearing for
bis life, Mornoh fted and was consequently replaced by none other than Strasser
who subsequently became President. A military council would corne to run the
country262. Inheriting his predecessor’s problems, Strasser quickly needed to put in
order a comprehensive plan offsetting the RUF and its encroachment on Sierra
Leonean territory. His initial move consisted of re-opening the channels of
communication with the RUF’s leader Sankoh.
However, local conditions in terms of balance in miiitary capabilities
between the government and the RUF were unfavorable and not conducive to
negotiations. The RUF perceived that it could attain unilateral victory which would
have been more beneficial than the potential benefits inherent in any future
conciliation. The “RUF couid taste victory and were not interested in
negotiation”263. Despite Strasser’s attempts, no dialogue or negotiation would resuit
from these efforts.
At this critical point in time, Sierra Leone’s political administration decided
it was time to alter its military approach. As the RUF sustained its unrelenting line
of attack on Freetown, the increasingly desperate government turned outwards for
assistance requesting bilateral support from Nigeria. Since Liberia had increasingly
become a destabilizing force for flot only Sierra Leone but also the entire region,
the request was tended to and “two thousand troops were sent to Freetown, and a
few fighter aircraft were stationed at the airport”264.
Strasser’s next move was to strengthen bis armed forces in order to back up
the Nigerian exercise in Freetown. By “late January 1994, the national army
260 lames R. Davis, Fortunes Warriors: Private Armies and the New World Order, 133.
261 Ibid., 134.
262 Ibid., 134.
263 Ibid., 134.
264 Ibid., 134.
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swelled in size from five thousand regulars to more than twelve thousand” . This
new course of action was however done without much reflection or planning. The
state’s political elite’s impetuous decision to expand its military was done hastily
by the arbitrary drafting of new recruits. In an incomprehensive and random
manner, the government indiscriminately enlisted released prisoners, drug addicts
and kids from the streets in order to fui abstract quotas266. This unsystematic
approach meant that when government forces were deployed, the newly enlisted
soldiers were deficient and lacked essential military training. The conscripts’ daiiy
“ration of marijuana and rum did flot help matters much either, and the
government’s military soon dissolved into a looting force that tended to target the
civilian populace instead of the rebels”267. The new military approacli ironically
only made matters worse. There “were no coherent front lines, no political causes,
and for the terrorized public, no place was safe”268. Sierra Leone’s civil war was
progressively deteriorating into a state of total civil chaos269. By early 1994-95,
Sierra Leone’s military situation had only worsened since the first serious signs of
trouble emerged in 1991270. A negotiated resolution was flot likely at this juncture.
Lack ofa MHS?
From 1991 to 1995, Sierra Leone’s civil war lacked ripe moments for a
negotiated resolution to take place. The RUF ostensibly had no interest in
negotiating with its counterpart since its leader Sankoh recognized that the balance
of military power was in his faction’s favor. The RUF was indeed strong relative to
the government’ s armed forces in terms of territorial acquisitions and military
capabilities (etc.). The rebel force had steadily conquered vital territory in Sierra
265 James R. Davis, Fortune’s Warriors: Private Armies and the New World Order, 134.
266 Ibid., 134.
267 Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrior, The Rise oJthe PrivatizedMilitarv Industrv, 112.
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Leone, its progress was accelerating as time passed. The RUF was also very
conscious of the government military’s iimited capabilities.
The rebel RUF forces had managed to take control over the major diamond
mines, a significant source of revenue for the govemment, and had successfully
surrounded Sierra Leone’s government in the capital city271. Although the RUF
counted approximately several thousand at the most and 350 hard core fighters
according to a high ranidng U.S. officiai, it militarily dominated the national arrny
on the fieid272. The RUF “aided by a general breakdown in order and disloyai
government soidiers, had advanced by May 1995 to within 20 miles of the capital
of Freetown”273.
The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF) on the other hand,
lacked most qualities normally attributed to state armies. The RSLMf “hardly
qualified as an army, despite its size of perhaps 14,000 soldiers (two thirds of
whom at been hastiiy recruited)”274. Stevens and Momoh had ethnicized the
military and had severely cut its budget275. The “World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (EVIF) increasingly pressed the government to lower military
funding, following the army’s hasty buildup from about 3,000 to ll,000276. What’s
more, Sierra Leone’s state army was highly corrupt. RSLMF members were
commonly referred to as sobets (“soidiers by day, rebels by night”), a term
denoting soldiers who engaged in banditry and rebel activities277.
The Sierra Leonean “army was defeated, and the situation looked grim [...]
in fact, it was a repeat of the MPLA’s situation in late 1993278. A sense of doom
was quickly developing as RUF brutal atrocities against Sierra Leone’s populace
persisted, whilst the government’s troops were too inept to defend their nation.
Over the four-year war, “1.5 million people in that country had become refugees
271 James R. Davis, Fortune ‘s Warriors: Private Armies and tite New World Order, 135.
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and over 15,000 had been ldlled”279. The government was indeed “facing a
desperate situation in which the insurgents had cut off the government’s last major
source of domestic revenue earlier that year”280. There was indeed no symmetry in
terms of military power and there was no painful deadlock. In game theoretic
terms, Sierra Leone’s main players were stili trapped in a Prisoners Dilemina Game
and hence had no incentive to negotiate. The local power dynamics thus led to the
prolongation of Sierra Leone’s intra-state war.
Sierra Leone’s political administration had its back against the wall and had
littie alternatives from which to choose. Unlike the FAA in Angola which managed
to regain at least some of its lost territory single-handedly, Sierra Leone’s armed
forces were completely ineffectual and were no match for the RUF. Thus, despite
its efforts, Sierra Leone’s government alone could not change the tide of war in
order to create a MHS. The RUF was too strong of an opponent for the Sierra
Leonean government to combat.
Pro voking u MHS via the outsourcing ofEO?
The situation in Sierra Leone in 1994 was such that war carried on to the
detriment of negotiations. Both camps faiÏed to be trapped in a painful military
deadlock and as a result, the RUF stili hoped to lead an attrition war. However, an
important factor came into play in 1995 which would significantly alter Sierra
Leone’s civil war: the intervention of an external third party. Sierra Leone’s
government being in a precarious position vis-à-vis its counterpart decided to
outsource private military services in April-May of 1995 for assistance in
suppressing the increasingly prevalent rebel movement281. In an unprecedented
move, the government turned outward to a firm called J&S Franklin Limited,
which then subcontracted Channel Islands-based Gurkha Security Group (GSC) in
order to train and guide its armed forces. The intervention of this external player
279 Robert Mande!, Annies without States, the Privatization ofSecurity, 110.
280 Ibid., 110.
281 Ibid., 110.
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was nevertheless cut short when a rebel ambush in february of 1995 cost the firm
heavy casualties, including the loss of its local commander Bob Mckenzie282.
As a resuit, the defense firm broke its contract and Sierra Leone’s
government was left once again vuinerable and defenseless vis-à-vis its rebel
counterpart. Desperately requiring external aid, Strasser then turned to EO, a
company which by many accounts had just withdrawn from a successful mission in
Angola. At this point in time, EO’s involvement would be critical because the RUF
was on the verge of victory. By April 1995, the RUF had already dangerousÏy
advanced toward the capital and held significant control over the country’s main
783
mining regions
As Sierra Leone’s context demonstrated at the time, privatized security was
perhaps “the only option with any hope of restoring order, filling a void where
existing government authorities are fearful of treading due to political, military, or
financial costs”284. As was the case in Angola, EO was once again a perfect
candidate for managing Sierra Leone’s particular needs. Seeing that Sierra Leone
was a country with a dreadfully low military capability, using ex-SADF personnel
had a number of advantages, such as experience in low warfare combat,
counterinsurgency, weapon selection (etc.). As Deborah Avant spelled out,
“military contractors can enhance the power of individual states, as when failed
states like Sierra Leone essentially buy an army”285. Since govemment troops
lacked even basic military qualifications, EO could compensate for these
deficiencies by providing comprehensive packages. EO’s “training packages
covered the entire realm of military operations, including everything from basic
infantry training and armored warfare specialties to parachute operations”286.
Essentially, EO had assumed responsibility for Sierra Leone’s state functions since
security and order could no longer be guaranteed by the government.
282 Peter Warren Singer, Corporate Warrior, The Rise ofthe Privatized Mititaiy Indust’, 112.
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Furthermore, as a resuit of its extensive involvement in Angola just one
year prior to its involvement in Sierra Leone, EO had gained an insider’s view of
the special needs weak and fragile governments had in the region. This knowledge
proved very valuable for Sierra Leone’s miÏitary since EO was familiar with the
RUF’s strengths and weaknesses and could use that knowledge to its advantage.
Since EO’s contribution was extensive between 1995 and 1997, we shah examine
the effects that EO’s involvement generated on Sierra Leone’s civil war. Did EO
help generate ripeness through the crafting of a MHS, resulting in the November
1996 Abidjan Accords? In order to uncover whether EO did indeed contribute to
the creation of a MHS in its two year contract (approximately from April-May
1995 to January 1997), we shall draw on our four indicators discussed earlier in
Chapter Two.
EO ‘s impact on territory
In the military sphere, it appears as though the dominant perception among
the political elite of both camps in 1996 was that a military stalemate did in fact
exist, and thus led to the November 1996 Abidjan Accords (ten months following
Sierra Leone’s first multiparty elections). However, this perception of a MHS was
flot present in 1995 prior to EO’s intervention. Was there indeed a link between EO
and a MHS leading to the Abidjan Accords?
When EO was initially introduced to the case of Sierra Leone in May 1995,
the RUF had already attained a predominant position in terms of territorial
acquisitions. The RUF was rapidly gaining head way by progressively exerting
control over areas traditionally run by government authorities. By 1995, the RUF
held much of the countryside and was in close proximity of Freetown287. The
diamond mines were overrun and the government was surrounded in the capital
city. The Sierra Leonean army was overwhelmed and near total defeat.
287 Department for International Development (DFID), “Country Profiles: Africa”, available at.
<http://www.dfid.gov.uklcountries/africalsierraleone.asp> (last updated March 24, 2006,
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Being fully aware of the potential benefits derived from territorial control
and expansion, Sankoh made a concerted effort to expropriate as much territory as
possible. The “RUF was allowed to reconsolidate its position and, by the end of
1994, bcgan a series of raids from its forest camps into virtually ail parts of the
country, reaching areas close to Freetown by the beginning of l995288. Having
dangerously approached the capital by 1995, the RUF intended to prolong the
conflict in an attempt to escalate the intensity of the war. The situation pertaining to
the defense of the country’ s capital city became so alarming that even embassies
starting evacuating their staff289. The rebel insurgency was 50 successful that, not
onÏy were the alluvial diamond fields of the south east and north east overrun, but
“the areas of bauxite and rutile mining were also captured, production had stopped,
and thus most of the foreign exchange revenue essential to govemment operations
was flot available”290. Sankoh indeed gained many advantages from lis
encroachment on Sierra Leonean tenitory. His greatest strategic advantage was a
resuit of bis control over the diamond mining areas, which enabled him to expand
and improve bis army into a significant force by exploiting the diamond trade, ail
the while handicapping the government’s armed forces. In other words, it was not
in the RUF’s interests to negotiate with the government since the RUF was reaping
many benefits from the war. There was no MHS and the war still held an
asymmetrical structure which was flot conducive to negotiations.
Recapturing territory rich in natural resources from the RUF was one of the
government’s first priorities in its bid to reclaim authority over the country.
Accomplishing this would not only allow the government to reinvest much needed
revenue into its war effort, but would also sever the RUF’s earnings required for its
war aims (rearmament purposes etc.). Regaining valuable territory from the RUF
would ultimately help redress a symmetrical structure in Sierra Leone’s intra-state
war.
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Since regaining territorial assets was one of the government’s main
concerns in its battie against the RUF, EO’s contract primariÏy focused on the
conflict’s territorial dynamics. EO’s military plan was especially comprehensive
and relatively more wide-ranging when compared to EO’s initial Soyo contract in
Angola. In accordance to the government’s most urgent needs, EO devised a three
phased operational strategy: resolve the siege on Freetown; protect the alluvial
diamond area around Koindu; and destroy the RUF headquarters291. Each ofthese
three stages would allow the government to gain headway in its war against the
RUF rebels by reclaiming control over the sovereign state of Sierra Leone. EO
systematically sketched out a comprehensive plan for recapturing specific targeted
areas. It focused on strategic sites such as oil and mining regions, key
infrastructure, and military bases (chase the RUF from its military bases via
electronic intelligence and Special Forces reconnaissance teams).
Resolving the siege on Freetown was the first step in EO’s plan. Regaining
control of a capital city is aiways an important military objective and proves to be a
vital symbolic exercise because it validates a government’s authority over its
sovereign state and “gives the government some breathing room”292. A country’s
capital city is the emblem of state and government and is thus almost aiways a
“primary target in war, as capturing it usually guarantees capture of much of the
enemy government, victory for the attacldng forces, or at the very least
demoralization for the defeated forces”293. What’s more is that in the case of Sierra
Leone, Freetown was especially vital in the war effort for strategic and logistics
considerations. The major roads running through Freetown were the main channels
for food and fuel transport, and thus, urgently needed to be reopened to assist in the
joint EO/government operations294. Lifting the siege on the capital city was hence a
prerequisite for the success of the alliance’s une of attack.
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The RUF center of operations in the siege on Freetown was “out of a base
to the east of the city in a location known as Ma-Sherwe”295. The EO/government
alliance, aware of the RUF’s positioning and setting, sketched a tactical
contingency battie plan to drive the rebels further back into the bushes. The
government battalion level combined operation set up by EO was well matched for
this challenge. It was efficiently prearranged and equipped with military armored
vehicles and Russian built helicopters to overcome geographical and mobiÏity
obstacles. As expected, the joint EO/government operation was successful. The
siege on freetown was lifted in only ten days. Within:
nine days, the EO force had flot only stopped the rebel advance,
but sent them back 126 kilometers into the jungle interior, mainly
through the sldlful employment of helicopter gunships that had not
been used in the conffict previously296.
This was “the first battie of the war in which the government troops had achieved
positive resuits, with fifty rebels Idlled within two days and the siege lifted in ten
days”297. This impaired the RUF since by this time:
about 200 rebels had been killed and there were more than 1 000
deserters, most of the latter having been enlisted as unwilling
conscripts and employed, among others, as porters and general
laborers298.
Amid its numerous batties against the RUF, this represented one of the very
first times the government accomplished success against its opponent, strongly
suggesting that EO had a direct impact on the local power dynamics. EO
effectively demonstrated its capabilities during its very first exercise seeing that it
reclaimed in only ten days Sierra Leone’s capital city while deployed. This battie
was a huge blow to rebel morale because it demonstrated that an extemal third
party player had the capacity to affect the war effort of an establislied local faction.
Indisputably defeated in the country’s capital during EO’s very first exercise, the
295 lan Douglas (1999) “Chapter 9: Fighting for Diamonds - Private Military Companies in Sierra
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RUF had no other choice but to retreat 100 idiometers into the interior299. The joint
EO/government effort led to the alliance’s first victory, allowing the government to
reclaim control over the country’ s capital. Despite the scale and symbolic
significance of this initial success, there was still no symmetry in terms of
territorial control since only one of the three phases of the operational strategy had
been completed and the RUF stili exerted control over much of Sierra Leone’s
main mining regions. The RUF stiil had confidence in successfully escalating the
war and it was stiil ready to bear the costs associated with the escalation since it
deemed them tolerable (in the view of obtaining a unilateral victory).
After having lifted the siege on the capital city, EO carried on with its
mission by instigating in lune 1995 the second phase of the operational strategy
around the diamond areas of Kono300. The “second phase of the joint
government/EO operational strategy was to stabilize the alluvial diamond area
around Koindu by removing rebel forces from the area”301. The rebel’s control over
the productive areas of the country was a major obstacle to the government’s war
aims since the funds made available through the extraction of natural resources
were fundamental for fueling the war. This operation “met with little opposition
and, by July, the mines were back in government hands”302. The alliance’s
operations were 50 successful that the Koindu region was recaptured in only a
matter of days and area clearing operations were subsequently carried out in the
Kono area303. Later, by “late January 1996, EO-backed forces had retaken the
southern coastal rutile and bauxite mines, notably those belonging to Sierra Rutile
and Sieromco”304. This series of victories was a significant element in the
government’s overall struggle against the RUF since the Kono region generated
large sums of revenue which were used by the rebel insurgency to fuel the war and
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gain a disproportionate advantage vis-à-vis the government. Aithougli “EO’s
military efforts did not destroy the RUF, they forced them out of the vital diamond
and rutile-producing areas, compelling them to seek sanctuary in the deep
forest”305. The new developments triggered by the involvement of EO had altered
the nature of Sierra Leone’s intra-state war and its balance in military capabilities.
While this was a major blow to the rebels’ war aims, the RUF was not entirely
defeated. The situation was flot yet completely ripe but the structure of the war had
definitely changed into a more symmetrical one.
The EO/government’s third objective was more tactical in nature and
consisted of locating and destroying RUF headquarters306. EO’s “strategy mandated
the constant pursuit and punishment of the rebel force, whenever it came into
contact”307. After having successfully seized the RUF’s stronghold in the Kangari
Hills in a ground assault308, the EO/government alliance went on to pursue the
RUF’s main center of operations. Employing up to date military technology such
electronic intelligence and air-ground reconnaissance, EO successfully located the
“RUF main headquarters fifty miles east of the capital and brouglit it under attack,
killing many of the RUF leadership and destroying their ability to wage a concerted
guerilla warfare”309. This was a significant blow to the rebel force since “follow-up
intelligence indicated that this was formerly the main springboard for operations
against Freetown”310. By knocldng down this major command center, the
EO/government alliance had in effect destroyed the RUF’s ability to plan, organize
and execute major operations. The rebel force’s military capabilities were thus
seriously hindered as a resuit of EO’s active engagement.
At this juncture, the RUF had lost vital territory which they had previously
drawn on for symbolic recognition (the country’s capital city), financial use (the
mining areas) and strategic positioning (the RUF headquarters). The joint
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EO/governrnent force, which had grown to be the spearhead of Sierra Leone’s
counteroffensive, proved to be a successful alliance since the RUF had increasingly
become vuinerable and exposed, and could no longer retreat to its headquarters for
resting ground. There “were stili many small roving hands around the country, but
it would take a lot of time and money to rebuild the rnovernent”311. By now, the
RUF had becorne vuinerable and virtually defenseless seeing that it was cut off
from most of its sources of supply and had no quarters left to retreat to. The RUF
fighters had been “driven back to enclaves along Sierra Leone’s border”312. Sierra
Leone’s territorial dynamics were thus altered as a consequence of F0 intervention
and the governrnent had rnanaged to re-expropriate much lost territory.
A comparison between the rnaps of 1994 and 1996 clearly highuights the
territorial expansion the government had accomplished during EO’s involvement.
Although the areas of RUF control in 1994 were limited, the areas of RUF
operations extended country wide and included the strategic regions of the Kono
mining areas. In contrast, the map of 1996 demonstrates that the government
gained predominant control over much of the territory where the RUF had
previously held important operations. The governrnent, assisted by F0, had corne
to hold control over economicalÏy rich areas. By November 1996, governrnent
offensives had reduced the RUF’s territorial control, in stark contrast to the
situation prior to E0’s involvement. Although F0 did flot annihilate the RUF, it
stiil rnanaged to alter Sierra Leone’s map by assisting the government in taldng
control over much of the country’s strategic sites.
The change in territorial dynamics was a huge victory for Strasser. Whule
Strasser scored military points from E0’s involvernent, lie was under pressure to
restore civiÏian rule. He thus announced that elections would be held February 16,
1996. AÏthough Strasser had achieved military progress in the war waged against
the RUF thanks to E0, internai political factors provoked bis removal from power
as his deputy Brigardier Julius Maada Bio overthrew him January 16, 1996 due to
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fears over a return to civilian rule3°. The RUF’s state of military affairs was not
however altered as a resuit of the coup. The rebel force was stili in a costly
situation and no longer held a predominant position vis-à-vis its governmental
counterpart like it did prior to E0’s intervention.
In an unprecedented move (revealing symptoms of war weariness), the
“RUF announced a unilateral cease-fire and offered to taÏk to Bio’s government
unconditionally”314. Despite the coup, elections finally did take place in February
1996 and a ceasefire was eventually reached in April 1996, demonstrating
willingness on the part of the rebels to hait the war and negotiate. By:
April 1996, the combined efforts ofEO and the Kamajor315 caused
Sankoh and the RUF to seek a cease-fire; however, it was another
seven months before a peace agreement was finally signed in
November316
In “November, the RUF leader signed peace accords, which, as in Angola,
mandated E0’s withdrawal as a condition of signature”317. This strongly suggests
that the RUF had corne to realize that F0 was in fact in part responsible for its own
downfall. After having signed the peace agreement, “Sankoh conceded that, had
F0 flot intervened, lie would have taken Freetown and won the war”318. F0 “had
temporarily defeated the RUF in the field that staved off further loss by entering
into negotiations”319. Negotiations had thus become to be seen as beneficial to both
adversaries. This signaled a major change in the local power dynamics of the
conflict.
RUF territorial defeats thus altered the tide of the war. The “combined
efforts of F0, the Kamajors [a locally based paramilitary force that E0 had built an
313 lan Douglas (1999) Chapter 9: Fighting for Diamonds
- Private Military Companies in Sierra
Leone”, 184.
311 Ibid., 184.
315 The Kamajors are a Iocally based paramititary force that EO had built an alliance with.
316 lan Douglas (1999) “Chapter 9: Fighting for Diamonds - Private Military Companies in Sierra
Leone”, 184.
317 Peter Wanen Singer. Corporate Warrio,-, The Rise ofthe Prilatied Mititan IndustR’, 114.
Ibid., 114.
lan Douglas (1999) “Chapter 9: Fighiing for Diamonds
- Private Military Companies in Sierra
Leone”, 184.
92
alliance with]320, and to a lesser extent the army, broke and scattered the RUF in
early 1996321. Although they were “flot completely defeated, the rebel leadership
under Foday Sankoh knew their force was shattered [...J in April, Sankoh asked for
a cease fire and let it be known that lie was willing to negotiate”322. Hence, EO
provided temporary stability (after having helped escalate and intensify the conftict
until the attainment of MHS) which lcd to negotiations. Since
the launching of the Kamajor militia and the arrivai of EO, the RUF
had suffered serious setbacks. The two forces had collaborated
closely to seek out RUF bush camps and in less than two months
they idlled an estimated 1,000 of the RUFs best fighters and
destroyed several of their bases. More importantly, they had also
pushed the RUF away from the main diamond districts323.
The Sierra Leone government’s successes were unprecedented. EO’s
assistance helped them exploit the RUF’s weaknesses on the battlefieid. This series
of stunning and rapid victories was a huge blow to the RUF’s war effort since it
caught Sankoh off guard. The regions reclaimed by the government were Sankoh’s
key financial assets and having to lose them was very costly. The govemment, with
EO support, had finally become a worthy opponent. The foundations of a stalemate
were beginning to develop. The map of 1996 partly points to the symmetrical
structure Sierra Leone’s civil war had taken on for the November 1996 Peace
Talks. Althougli the joint EO/government effort did not manage to annihilate the
RUF from ail Sierra Leonean tenitory, it definiteiy did manage to thwart the RUF’s
plans for a unilateral victory by inhibiting its territorial predominance. A rough
symmetry between the government and the RUF in terms of territorial acquisitions
was undeniably emerging as a resuit of EO’s presence.
EO and inilitaiy capabilities
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We shah continue our analysis by drawing on our military indicator in order
to further examine the effect EO had on the development of a MHS in Sierra
Leone. When considering military aptitude and troop morale, the government and
the RUF were certainly flot in a situation of parity in 1994-1995. Syrmnetry, an
essential component of a MHS, was missing. On the one hand, the government’s
military wing was in a dire state (prior to EO’s intervention in 1995)324. In an
attempt to resolve the immediate challenges facing Sierra Leone, Strasser decided
to enlarge the national army. Although he managed to swehl Sierra Leone’s army
by enlisting new recruits, by early 1995 the “army was proving entirely ineffective
and the country was in ruins”325. Due to poor planning and hasty recruitment
methods, government troops were both “devoid of professional sldlls, and
3”6 . .
corrupt” - . The government’s abihty to defy the RUF was undermined by its very
fraudulent nature. The army had been largely “ceremonial, completely
unprofessional, and recruited from among the same alienated youths as the RUF
[...] consequently, there was littie resistance and the towns and villages quicldy feu
to the rebels”327.
The atmosphere within Sierra Leone’s pohiticai and military circles was
becoming increasingly bleak seeing that it had aÏready been three years since
Sankoh ftrst launched Sierra Leone’s civil war in March 1991 by crossing the
border from Liberia, and government troops were still unable to defeat the RUF.
Despite frequent internai attempts, different approaclies, numerous strategies, and a
number of different leaders, Sierra Leone’s military was too ineffective and weak
to suppress its increasingly strong counterpart. It soon became apparent that unless
the govemment did something drastic to counter the rebeis, the RUF would escalate
the conflict until the point of attaining unilateral victory.
On the other hand, the RUF proved astoundingiy resilient and was reaping
the benefits of its attacks on the government. At no other time in Sierra Leone’s
history had the RUF acquired so much supremacy in terms of regional power,
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territorial gains, and military clout. The fact that this rebel insurgency had
continued to operate for over three brutal and intense years of resistance confirmed
their strength, power, resilience and morale. One of the reasons why the RUF was
proving hard to defeat was due in part to its ambiguous nature and composition.
The RUF was unpredictable and volatile and had no cleariy defined politicai
agenda328. The rebels were a:
mysterious faction with no coherent ideology and a constantiy
changing composition, and they persistently refused to enter into
negotiations with Strasser’s regime, denying its legitimacy and
demanding the withdrawai of Guinean and Nigerian troops assisting
the Sierra Leone government329.
The continuaiiy altering nature of the RUF hence made it more difficuit to defeat.
Sankoh’s “attacks more than succeeded in that respect”330.
Although the RUF was flot ideologicai in the classical sense, it did however
appeai to the country’s most dispossessed and aiienated by the failures of post
independence. The rebel insurgency succeeded in many respects because it
exploited “the cleavages that spiit Sierra Leone (between town and country and
between the repatriated-siave dite and indigenous people)”331. Although the RUF
exploited internai cieavages, it also depended on the spoiier agenda of neighboring
states such as Liberia and Guinea for support. For strategic purposes, the RUF
“depended upon outside support from Libya, Guinea and Liberia, while tacticaliy,
it depended upon gueriiia tactics, foraging, and the capture of arms and equipment
from the RSLMF which was weak, poorly ied and seemed prone to flee on
contact”332.
The RUF’s operations continued to grow and expand unhindered between
1994 and 1995. Not only did Sankoh’s military faction aiready possess a large
fighting force but it also enjoyed a steady growth as a result of the territorial
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expansion it recently acquired and the terror it exerted across the countryside,
“abducting chuidren and forcing them to Idil on its behalf’333. Additional recmits
were persistently being enlïsted into the ranks of the RUF military through coercïon
and intimidation. This was in a sense the form of conscription that the RUF had
imposed on Sierra Leone’s citizens and youth. Whule research on the RUF is
limited, the RUF’s overali strength has been estimated at “three to four thousand
with a hard core of five to six hundred soldiers”334. Operationally, the RUF held a
relatively clear chain of command, and was “roughly organized into six battalions,
each of which operated from jungle camps, using classic guerilla tactics”335.
Sankoh also benefited from wireless communication transmission systems,
with “an efficient radio network consisting of about twenty radio stations
throughout the country”336. An “office in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, which was part of
the radio network, deait with international relations, and was controlled by
Sankoh’s brother”337. Sankoh’s broadcasting instruments were useful in many
respects. Among others, they allowed him to make use of propaganda methods,
such as siipping war messages and boosting the responsiveness of local
communities and regions. This was yet another strategy used by Sankoh to foster
the war against the government. Hence, with an increase in territorial gains, an
ample amount of fighters, an adequate level of organization, and a willingness to
employ brutal methods, the rebel insurgency was a serious threat to the
govemment’s weak hold on power. The RUF was on the path towards victory.
Ail this serves to illustrate that the RUF was in a superior position vis-à-vis
its counterpart in 1994-95 in terms of military indicators. From the govemment’s
perspective, the RUF troops were more skilled and proficient than its own and the
likelihood of defeating them seemed unlikely. The rebel insurgency was
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overwhelmingly predominant in terms of military capabilities and had already
managed to “overrun the diamond mines, and the government was surrounded in
the capital city”338. Nearing total defeat in 1995, Sierra Leone’s government had
very littie options left.
However unforeseen, the government managed to alter the balance in
military power as ofmid-1995. E0 likely had a significant impact as its arrival
coincided with the exact turning point in the country’s civil war. After a string of
faltering attempts in suppressing the RUF, the govemment finally decided to seek
external assistance and turned to a PMF. It initially contracted E0 in 1995 to “help
its faltering four-year campaign against the RUF”339. Sierra Leone’s armed forces,
although not firmly in a predominant position by 1996, had finally been
transformed into a challenging opponent to the RUF who had to this point
significantly encroached unto Sierra Leonean territory. E0 enhanced the
government’s raw military capability by providing sound military strategic and
tactical advice. Ail things being interrelated, these technical attributes would later
contribute to an increase in government miÏitary morale which would uÏtimately
lead them to defeat the RUF.
When considering the RUF’s rapid encroachment on Sierra Leonean sou in
only four years, E0’s military progress in only two was mucli unanticipated as it
cauglit the rebel insurgency off guard340. As in Angola, this PMF primarily
operated as a force multiplier. F0 personnel would thus be embedded in and
supporting local Sierra Leone army units. With E0 operating as a force multiplier,
an increase in the quality of local army brigades was inevitable. That being said, the
RUF would no longer solely be competing against unprofessional and corrupt
armed forces but rather against the military capabilities of an elite fighting force
with extensive experience in regional conflicts. The contract required F0 to
“provide 150 to 200 soldiers fully equipped and with helicopter support, mandated
to support the RSLMF with training and other forms of assistance, while aiding in
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prosecuting the war against the RUF”341. Although its operations were fairly varied
and broad, EO for the most part “provided technical services, combat forces, and
training”342. Arriving in 1995, flot only did EO employees train as many as 150
government soldiers in just a few weeks, they aiso helped create an alliance with
the Kamajors, who later proved crucial in the battie against the RUF343.
Due to the incompetent and unprofessional nature of the national army,
EO’s role in training the government’s armed forces was both necessary and
extensive. The “first item of business was a restructuring exercise, directed by EO,
which saw the reorganization of basic and specialist training”344. EO’s course
schedule for training in Sierra Leone in 1995-1996 was wide-ranging and included
skilis such as Basic Training, Rapid Reaction Force, Mortar Training, Section
Leaders, Junior Commanders, Infantry, Basic Base Protection, and Battalion
Mortars (etc.)345. However, given the dire situation and immediate threat facing the
govemment at the time of EO’s arrivai, “a crash course for individual soldiers and
rifle companies was conducted at the same time to deter the immediate threat to
Freetown”346. Therefore, the training package that EO provided the national army
with was extensive and included the juggiing of different priorities and concerns
concurrently.
While training activities were moving forward, EO also provided the
government with skills beyond training activity. The South African PMf also
supplied its client “with the essential, though less visible functions of information
and intelligence gathering, command, control and communications, helicopter
support, and finally a guarantee of both logistic and fire support for operations”347.
EO’s experience in Angola had confirmed the importance of intelligence
capabilities in counterinsurgency wars. Sources inside EO have revealed that the
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“organization in Sierra Leone conducted counterintelligence operations, and
intelligence operations at times of identifying possible informants, isolating and
training them, and then suppiying them with communications, equipment”348.
Intelligence capabilities conferred a significant advantage to the government who
was as a resuit in a better position to understand the strengths (map out the location
of the RUF’s bases, etc.) and exploit the weaknesses (slow deployable capacity,
etc.) of its opponent. These intelligence capabilities proved later to be a vital asset
in Sierra Leone’s war seeing that “inadequate intelligence had hamstrung other
recent African interventions, most notably that of ECOMOG in Liberia”349.
Beyond training and intelligence capabilities, EO also provided logistics
support and rapid deployable means, which later proved imperative in ail three
elements ofthe ‘find, fix and destroy’ approach. Most of EO’s operations in Sierra
Leone were “characterized by the effective use of helicopters and co-coordinated
fire support [...J in classic air-mobile operations, EO sought to find, fix and
destroy”350. The better quality combat equipment of EO was an important asset in
Sierra Leone’s war. Most local units prior to EO’s arrivai did not have sufficient or
fuiiy functional equipment. fr1 terms of mobility, most units also failed to have
logistic support. They did flot have the capacity to transport supplies and troops.
But EO had prepared for government troops to have at their disposai ail the
materiai needed to effectively battie the rebel insurgency and allow government
troops to have operational control over the country. These equipment purchases
ailowed EO to conduct extremely mobile attacks and to deploy rapidly in any
region of the country. EO also had a fairly modem communication network which
enabled the government to bypass the logistics probiems of operating in Sierra
Leone. The govemnment now had at its disposition a rapid deployable and mobile
force, and soiid iogistical base to find, fix and destroy the enemy. The joint
EO/government endeavor:
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first found the RUF, using electronic warfare and good intelligence;
then fixed them in place using direct fire from helicopters and
indirect fire from mortars flown into position; and, finally destroyed
the enemy by using helicopter-borne assault troops351.
The RUF had become so vuinerable that it was no longer even capable of
withdrawing to its bases for protection and resting ground since no quarter or area
was out of reach of EO’s highly mobile teams. The tactics used by the newly
formed alliance were incredibly efficient as they inflicted littie costs on the
government, ensuring very low casualties, and very high collateral damage on the
opponent, inflicting higli casualties and affecting the military morale of the RUF.
As seen earlier in our section pertaining to territorial indicators, the first
priority on the agenda of the joint EO/government effort consisted of lifting the
siege on Freetown. And as demonstrated earlier, the mission was a huge success as
the siege was lifted in only ten days. More than 200 rebels had been ldlled, and
more than 1,000 had deserted the RUF’s base352. Regaining control over the capital
city was important for symbolic reasons but also for strategic and logistics reasons
as the main roads running across freetown were finally reopened, allowing for the
transportation of fuel and food353. Much of the mission’s success was due to the use
of classic air-mobile operations made possible by the synchronized use of air and
land equipment supplied by E0354. The RSLMF battalion-level combined operation
“was supported by two BMPs (Soviet-built armored personnel carriers), two Land
Rovers with mounted machine guns, and two Soviet-built helicopters (one Mi-17
and one Mi-24)”355. The assistance that EO provided the government of Sierra
Leone under the shape of training, logistics, advising and weaponry had obviously
boosted the government’s raw military capabilities seeing that this was the very
first battle of Sierra Leone’s intra-state war in which government troops were
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successful in defeating its opponent, thus strongly suggesting that E0 was
responsible for the change in the country’s military balance of power.
The second phase of the joint E0/government operation focused on
recapturing the diamond area around Koindu from the RUF356. This operation
“started in June 1995, with the same support group of armored vehicles, but with
two additional rifle companies”37. As seen earlier, the operation was a success.
Within just “a few days, and without much resistance, Koindu was recaptured and
‘area’ (clearing) operations were conducted in the Kono district”358. F0 had leamed
lessons from previous experiences though and applied them to its mission in Sierra
Leone. It became clear to E0 following Angola’s Soyo incident that suppressing
rebels from recaptured areas was not sufficient for protecting the area at hand and
for defeating the enemy. Troops needed to clear areas, and more importantly, hold
the areas. And in order to hold areas, moving combat troops out from conquered
areas too quicldy needed to be avoided. It became clear to E0 after their experience
in Soyo that perpetrators of violence would leave cleared areas only to filter back
later. Targeted areas needed to be kept safe from future enemy infiltration either
through stav behind companies (subcontracted by E0), longer term presence (of
E0), or immediate and enduring presence of local troops. Therefore, unlike the
episode in Soyo where clearing the area was the sole objective, F0 decided to first
clear, then occupy and finally retain a presence in the Koindu region in order to
prevent the RUF from recapturing the mining area upon their premature departure.
As “zones were cleared of rebels, the rest of the army began to settie in and reassert
itself around the country”359. Military advising, along with technical and training
support provided by E0, ensured the success of this first stage in the
E0/government operation.
The success of the second phase ofFO’s contract was critical for the
government’s war objectives since the reacquired areas were an important source of
revenue essential for financing the war. Jan Douglas, a retired Canadian general
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who worked in Sierra Leone from 1995 to 1996 under the command of the UN
wrote extensively “about his experiences in Sierra Leone and EO’s successes in the
1995 campaign”360. He wrote:
The retaldng of the mining areas demonstrated that a cohesive welÏ
trained organization, with appropriate intelligence and firepower,
had the abiÏity to defeat a force that outnumbered it significantly.
The success of small-unit operations by the RSLMF (Sierra Leonean
army) up to company level increased. This was particularly true
when the organization had been trained by, and bonded with, similar
EO elements. EO efficiently provided hard, combat-oriented training
programs, supplemented by knowledgeable leadership-and leaders
who led from the front, flot the back.
Hence, the force multiplier function carried out by EO had a direct impact on
changing Sierra Leone’s tide of war due to its influence on the government’s
military capabilities. It did much to alter the balance in military power, rendering
both parties more equivalent in terms of military capabilities. But it was the third
phase of the joint BO/government operation which would ultimately affect Sierra
Leone’s tide of war, culminating in a MHS.
The third objective of the joint EO/government strategy “was to locate and
destroy the RUF headquarters”362. This step was especialÏy crucial in terms of
miÏitary capabilities since headquarters are generally the centerpiece of military
strategy. They are the quarters for executing military plans and for organizing
logistics concerns. If one’s headquarters are destroyed, the entire balance of
military arrangements is overthrown. Once again, the joint EO/government strategy
incÏuded the use of modem equipment and military tactics. For this exercise, “air
reconnaissance indicated the presence of a large enemy base approximately eighty
ldlometers east of Freetown which was attacked on December 5, 1995”. Using
“electronic intelligence and air-and-ground reconnaissance, EO located the RUF
main headquarters [...] and brought under attack, killing many of the RUF
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leadership and destroying their ability to wage a concerted guerilla war”364. The
sldllful employment of helicopter gunships which had flot previously been used
proved particularly useful365. Follow up intelligence “indicated that this was
formerly the main springboard for operations against Freetown”366. At this point,
the RUF had lost control over the capital, had lost access to the mining regions, no
longer had headquarters to plan out their operations from and take refuge, and had
lost some of their top ranldng officiais. Without its headquarters intact, the RUF
was exposed and defenseless. Thefind, Jix, and destroy strategy had effectively
made the RUF a vulnerable and powerless entity. The government had finally
gained power and become a worthy opponent, for the most part due to the military
training provided by EO.
The main reason why the govemment’s operations were 50 successful is
that they were sustained by EO who employed new styles of warfare, placing the
enemy off guard. Whereas “the previous style of warfare prior to EO’s arrival had
been road-side ambushes and quick withdrawals, EO strategy mandated the
constant pursuit and punishment of the rebel force, wherever it came into
contact”367. In other words, EO was relentless and unyielding, seeldng to exhaust
and wear the enemy out until breaking point. EO’s “expertise in combat operations
and, especially, as a force multiplier garnered widespread respect”368. EO was
recognized as a key player in Sierra Leone among others, as it’s “troops proved
instrumental in several battles, for instance, at Cafunfo in Angola and Kono in
Sierra Leone”369. Its “pilots, oflen flying MiG fighters and MI helicopters, greatly
assisted ground and intelligence operations”370. EO’s strategy also “made use of air
and artillery assets and sought to engage the RUF in stand-up battles that the rebels
were loathe to face”371. The rebel force was effectively pushed back to the border
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regions and came to fully recognize the momentous and direct effect F0 had on its
war aims. Additional proof of this acknowledgment was the RUf’s declaration for
“a reward of $75,000 dollars in diamonds offered to anyone who could shoot down
one of E0’s helicopters”372. This suggests that the rebel insurgency recognized the
central role played by this PMF in the change of tides of Sierra Leone’s war.
Effectively overwhelmed, the “RUF agreed to negotiate with the government for
the first time”373.
The information above sheds light on the extent to which E0 helped in
altering the balance in military capabilities. The tide of war had undeniabÏy
changed due in large part to the intervention of F0. Like in Angola, the rebels
asked for the departure of F0 as a condition for negotiations to take place, strongly
suggesting that E0 had a direct impact on changing the tide of war during its
intervention. E0 once again helped in partially redressing the symmetricaÏ structure
of a war in Africa by creating military parity between the warring sides. Sankoh’s
drive to win a final victory had finally faded. The major losses witnessed by the
RUF soon led to the signing of the Abidjan Accords, effectively halting the civil
war. E0 had empowered government troops and assisted them in altering the
asymmetrical structure of the country’s civil war. E0’s involvement, in terms of
training, advising and combating thus positively helped boost the government’s
military capabilities and morale while acquiring more territory and control in Sierra
Leone. Many credit E0 for having provided short term stability and peace in the
country at hand (as a resuit as of having escalated the war and created a MHS).
F0 and economic costs
We shall now consider the effect E0 had on the war’s economic dynamics.
How did E0’s engagement change Sierra Leone’s tide of war during its
involvement and did it contribute to the creation of a MHS?
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There is an incredible potential for growth in Sierra Leone. But economic
development had mainly been hobbled by the looting of the RUF and the
corruption within government circles. As stated previously, the RUF was in a
disproportionately strong position vis-à-vis its counterpart in 1994. Particularly in
terms of financiai resources, the rebels had acquired much power because they held
control over much of the main mining regions. They collected large sums of
revenue from natural resources and gained considerable advantages from free labor
(forced labor necessary for the extraction of these resources). However, a year of
consistent war escalation between 1995 and 1996 coinciding with EO’s
intervention gravely affected the RUF’s economic resources, hence rendering its
war effort increasingly difficuit to sustain. Although the financial repercussions of
the war were costly for the govemment, the intensification of the war which took
place during EO’s involvement had an especially significant impact on the RUF
who had thus far been in a predominant position. And although it is true that the
mere survival of a rebel insurgency is often viewed as a victory in itself, the pace of
EO’s successes and concrete accomplishments injust one year seriously put the
mere future and literai survival of the RUF in jeopardy and rendered the costs
associated with the prolongation of war unbearable.
As a resuk of EO’s involvement, the RUF came to suffer hard blows which
threatened its very survival. As in many civil wars, the survival of a rebel
insurgency is often nanowiy connected to its economic strength374. Ail things being
interrelated, economic strength is aiso often closely connected to territory. During
EO’s very first months of involvement, Sankoh’s faction lost most of its newly
acquired territory and as a resuit the revenue that could be extracted from it. EO
had in effect eliminated the RUF’s presence in most of the economically productive
regions of the country. The South African PMF had in effect impaired the RUF’s
economic standing from the very first phase of its three-step campaign. Firstly, the
RUF’s loss over the capital city was problematic because it was a strategically
important site for transport and logistics purposes. The RUF’s loss over Freetown
Paul Collier, “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity”, Journal of Coî/7ict Resolution 44 (no. 6)
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was ail the more costly since many of the rebel insurgency’s forced laborers,
crucial for the extraction of natural resources and consequently the waging of the
war, were seized from them. The “RUF lost two hundred dead in two days of
fighting, and more than a thousand slave laborers, mostly chiidren, that the RUF
were holding were rescued”375.
Secondly, it was manifestly evident that if the government was to win the
war against the RUF, “it desperately needed the profits from its mining industry,
which [...] could onÏy be guaranteed by EO and its subordinates”376. It was a
seemingly hopeless situation for Sierra Leone’s government prior to EO’s
intervention seeing that “the insurgents had cut off the government’s last major
source of domestic revenue”377. Not only were the alluvial diamond fields of the
“south, east and north-east overrun by the RUF, but the areas of bauxite and rutile
mining were also captured, production had stopped, and thus most of the foreign
exchange revenue essential to the government operations was flot available”378. By
early 1995, the government was “in a desperate situation, since its primary source
of revenue-mining companies such as Branch Energy and Sierra Rutile-had ceased
to operate”379. The region of Koindu was particularly a main concern for the
government since it had “potential reserves valued at US $1,2 billion”380. The
govemmefit needed those funds to fuel its war effort.
Regaining control over the economically productive areas of the country
was thus a top priority in BO’s three-phase campaign strategy since these funds
would sustain the government’s war effort while simultaneously putting a strain on
the rebel insurgency’s war aims. As was demonstrated earlier, this second phase of
the war proved to be very successful as EO regained control over the important
mining region of Kono in only a couple of days. EO’s operations effectively
suppressed the dominance and most of the presence of the RUF in the country’s
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most productive areas. Aithough the services of EO came at a price, the cost of this
investment was reasonable when considering the territory the firm helped the
govemment regain (such as the Koindu region and its potential reserves). EO’s
price tag was aiso minute when considering the fact that the govemment was on the
verge of total defeat prior to EO’s arrivai, and risked losing ail of its diamond
assets. EO’s initial contract was “supplemented by contracts for additional
manpower that brought the total costs to $35 million, about $1.5 million per month
for the 21 months that the firm was in the country”381. Putting these figures into
context helps to highlight EO’s efficient and proficient nature. Given that one of
the contract’s goal “was to reestablish the government’s control over the
economically productive parts of the country and that it was a fraction of the
overali military budget, it seemed a pretty good deal to the govemment”382. As
anticipated, the loss of the Koindu region and the Kono mines was a huge blow to
the RUF’s war aims. It was ail the more distressing since it was a major source of
diverse unlawful activity and earnings for the rebel insurgency due to its proximity
to Sierra Leone’s borders. The RUF depended heavily on “the richest of Sierra
Leone’s prizes, the Kono diamond fields, and the commercial activity, licit or
illicit, associated with this area”383. The fact that:
Koindu, the centre of the region, is all of 500 ldiometers from the
capital Freetown, but only eight idlometers from the border with
Liberia, and three from that with Guinea, adds an international
complication to the quest for control and security-just as it enhances
the opportunities and rewards for a trade in contraband384.
In spite of a UN arms embargo, Liberia stiil managed to funnel arms, financial
and human support to RUF insurgents. Sierra Leone’s borders were dreadfully
porous and allowed the flow of funding and smuggling. EO ultimately helped
secure Sierra Leone’s borders and stem the level of illegal activity by re
appropriating the Koindu region. In other words, flot only did the RUF lose control
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over the Kono mining region but it also lost access to the borders with Liberia and
Guinea, major roadways for human and arms smuggling as well as illicit trading.
This greatly affected the RUF since the rebel insurgency largely depended upon
outside support from Libya, Guinea, and Liberia for strategic and economic
reasons385.
Lastly, the final step in the EO three-phase plan was also considerable in
economic terms seeing that the RUF’s main headquarters were destroyed. By
“various means, BO had located the main base in the jungle and a large force of
Kamajors, army units, and Soutli Africans attacked it”386. There “were stiil many
small roving hands around the country, but it would take a lot of time and money to
rebuild the movement”387. Ibis was the last blow which effectively made the RUF
submit to negotiations (first a cease tire) since it could no longer tolerate the costs
associated with the war. EO’s plan had been overwhelmingly successful that the
“formai diamond sector had begun to stage a minor recovery, largely because of the
protection afforded by EO to DiamondWorks properties”388.
Even critics of private miiitary activity acknowledge the positive impact EO
had on Sierra Leone in terms of economic indicators. William Reno, generally a
“critic of EO, notes that the force created the stability that attracted more foreign
investors, whose revenue helped lower the foreign debt 20 percent in 1995 and
1996 and that allowed nationwide elections in March l996389. The Sierra Leone
“experience lias demonstrated how a small, private security force can impact
positively and strongly upon a chaotic, destabilized state, and potentially establisli
the conditions for economic rejuvenation at minimal cost”390.
The gap in power and supremacy between the government and the rebel
insurgency was incrementally diminishing as the RUF came to suffer from an
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economic breakdown. The year which witnessed a drastic escalation in Sierra
Leone’s civil war allowed the government to reach rough parity with its
counterpart. It did however corne at a high price for both the government and the
RUF. The intensification of the conffict between 1994 and 1995 proved very costly
for the Sierra Leonean govemment. In other words, the costs associated with the
war were proving to be unbearable to ail parties involved. Negotiations were
increasingiy being favored as the costs were mounting. Therefore, aithough flot
quite in equai manners, the war was costly for both the Sierra Leonean government
and the RUF. Symmetry between both opponents was developing. A stalemate,
painful to both government troops and the RUF, had indeed developed and was in
part due to economic factors.
EO’ impact on potitical costs
We shah now examine the effect EO had on Sierra Leone by considering
the political factors that contributed to the creation of a MHS. In terms of political
power, the government and the RUF were obviously flot in similar situations in
1994. Whiie the government had legitimate authority over Sierra Leone due to
international and local recognition (despite many being alienated by the conditions
of post-independence), the RUF had no officiai standing since it was considered a
resistance movement. However, as is often the case with rebel movements, the
sheer existence of the RUF ciearly illustrated the government’s politicai inabihity
on the ground. The rebel insurgency had a significant fighting force and initially
enjoyed support from the disaffected.
The RUF had successfully taken control over parts of the country such as
the capital (albeit very briefly) and the main mining regions. Although the RUF
exercised a high degree of control and force over these areas, they did not benefit
from internai legitimacy within these controlled areas. The RUF’s hoÏd on power in
certain regions was not consistent with Spears’ definition of a state-within-a
state391 as was Savimbiland in Angola392. Stiil, with such a defiant temperament
Paul Kingston and lan S. Spears, States Within States: Incipient Potiticat Entities in the Post
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and with such extensive regional influence, Sankoh was definitely a considerable
threat to the govemment’s national authority. Although the RUF did flot benefit
from international or even broad local recognition, it stili did possess local
authority (through coercion) and support from neighboring countries.
As we have seen earlier, Sankoh generated revenues in order to sustain the
RUF’s war efforts. The sources of this revenue ranged from patron states to internai
sources in the form of forced labor to lucrative proceeds from diamond exports.
These profits enabled the RUF to establish basic levels of administration and
infrastructure, with miÏitary camps stationed across the country and extensive
communications systems including Sankoh’s own radio network393. However, as
established earlier, the RUF had corne to lose much of its source of revenue during
EO’s involvernent. No longer having the means to reinvest in the war movement,
the RUF grew increasingly desperate and turned to other methods for survival.
These latter means, often proving more brutal than were previously witnessed
inevitably came to the detriment of their long term war aims.
Although Sankoh’s track record for human rights was always very poor, a
shift from oid guerilla warfare to a worsening in terror tactics was noticeable in the
years of war escalation from 1994 to 1995. Due to EO’s intervention which
impeded the RUF’s source of income, the rebel faction was required to step up its
already very brutal methods in order to exploit communities for which support for
them was dismal. Having lost much of its territorial assets and lacking arms, food
and basic resources, the RUF increasingly had to steal and bot to survive. The
RUF’ s military units thus started to act more in a terrorist manner, amputating and
slaughtering dissidents, and attacking villages across their path. They attacked at a
Cotd War Era (New York: Pa1rave Macmillan. 2004).
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faster rate and in more brutal fashion poorly defended villages to seize weapons
and food395.
But the number of human rights abuses was flot confined to civilians. The
increasingly desperate and hopeless RUF started to wage attacks on humanitarian
orgaflizations as well. Many of these brutal attacks on unarmed peasants and on
humanitarian relief workers by the RUF were carefully documented by human
rights organizations and reporters such as Taylor Baines (Global Policy Forum). In
order:
to protect its growing empire chiidren are abducted and forced into
military service and aduits are terrorized into subservience. Any
opponents are killed or brutally mutilated through limb amputation
as a macabre warning for future enemies. Women are used as sex
slaves, and the RUF bas even been bold enough to abduct (but later
release) 500 UN peacekeepers396.
There were frequent reports of violations of the laws of war, including executions
of captured soldiers and scores of cases where children were forced to fight on the
war front and coerced into forced labor in the diamond industry. The RUF bas:
consorted with known terrorists, dabbled in illegal arms trading, squandered
[its] countries fortune in diamonds, and savagely tortured [its] own
countrymen for personal gain397.
The RUF was responsible for gross human rights abuses, including executions of
civilians and other deliberate and arbitrary killings. This would take a toll on the
faction’s support levels. EO flot only hurt the RUF by pushing it to the breaking
point but also hurt it by preventing the RUF from using Sierra Leone as a base of
operations. Local civilians even regarded EO personnel as heroes because they
protected them from the arbitrary brutality infticted by the RUF398. EO even helped
free forced free labor and kid soldiers from the coercion and grip of the RUF
James R. Davis, Fortunes Warriors: Privote Armies and the New World Orde,; 139.
396 Global Policy forum, february 2001, “When Crime Pays: West African Leader’s Brutality
Reaps Rewards” by Taylor Baines, available at.
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/intIjustice/wanted/2001/tay1or3.htm>(page consulted April
2006).
Ibid.
Peter Wanen Singer, Corporate Warrio, The Risc ofthe Privatized Militaiy Industiy, 103.
111
(especially in mining areas). Jan Douglas, serving under the UN in Sierra Leone
from 1995 to 1996 agrees with the idea that EO personne! were seen as heroes in
the streets399.
But the RUF was flot the only one suffering from political costs between
1994 and 1996. The government was also bearing painful political ramifications as
the violence increased in scope and iethality. With the RUF on a major line of
attack and with the involvement of a proficient private military firm, the conftict
rapidly intensified to previously unseen levels. Between 1994 and 1996, there were
more dead civilians than in the previous years of war. Some died of hunger, some
were !dlled in cross-fire, and many were separated from their families and villages.
The war had many effects on civilian life. Civilian iosses represented a serious
political cost for the government who was theoreticaliy responsible for the safety of
ail of Sierra Leone’s citizens. As a result, the government was perceived as a weak
government since it was unabie to ensure basic ievels of security. The government,
although stronger than its previous position in 1994, was stili bearing the
consequences of the war’ s escalation. The violence fed by the rebel insurgency
provoked a slide toward higher levels of instability and chaos, which reflected
poorly on the government who was unabie to assume responsibility for protecting
its own citizens. Yet, it is precisely the esca!ation of the war which created a MHS,
which ied both camps to the negotiation table. Although both the govemment and
the RUF were in a situation of rough parity, they were both bearing the political
costs associated with the war. They had reached a painfui deadlock, a situation no
longer viable for either of them.
Many have argued that:
regardless of Executive Outcome’s own purpose, its invoivement in
Sierra Leone was in a good cause. EO successfuily protected a
democratically elected government against a brutal and illegitimate
rebel force. And EO was certainly cheered in the streets of Freetown
for its efforts. Some wou!d also argue that the provision of weapons
to the democratically elected government of Tejan Kabbah
- a UN
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arms embargo notwithstanding - made sense and was in support of a
good cause400.
The problem is “not the individual episodes, but the bigger picture which they help
to form - of a world in which beleaguered and legitimate governments find littie
formai international protection against internai predators”401. In the absence of a
“governmental capacity for self-protection, and in the absence of effective
meclianisms for international protection, private security flrms and mercenaries
may be seen by some as the way of the future”402. In a certain sense, the
international community is ieft off the hook403. Therefore, F0 lielped Sierra
Leone’s government when no other party was wiiiing or capable. This PMF
managed to redress the symmetrical structure of the war and thus, created a MHS-a
painful deadlock, where both parties chose negotiation over war.
Conclusion
The case of Sierra Leone demonstrates that the 1996 November Abidjan
Accords were a direct resuit of the MHS created in 1996. Thus, the hypothesis
suggesting that F0 helped induce ripeness by creating a MHS between 1995 and
1997 lias been validated.
There was definiteiy no MHS in 1994 when the RUF was
disproportionately strong and believed it could lead an attrition war against its
counterpart. However, our four indicators demonstrate that Sierra Leone’s civil war
dynamics dramaticalÏy changed just two years later as Sierra Leone’s civil war took
on a symmetrical structure by 1996. The sum total of ail four indicators led to the
creation of the MHS.
E0’s intervention dramaticaliy affected the status-quo predominating in
1994 by altering the RUF’s footing in terms of territorial control, military
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capabilities, economic standing, and political leverage. By targeting the RUF’s
weak points, EO altered the local balance of power by rendering Sankoh’s faction
weak in comparison with the government. Despite the apparent changes witnessed
during EO’s intervention, a swift and total defeat of the RUF was still unrealistic
and improbable. The government, although with enhanced military might, stiil
found the idea of rapidly and permanently defeating the opposition unlikely, thus
rendering the potential benefits associated with negotiations a more sensible and
pragmatic outcome. The same applies for the RUF’s perceptions. No one party in
Sierra Leone’s intra-state war predominated at this critical moment.
Both the government and the RUF witnessed the war escalate and reach a
plateau after only a year of EO interference. Both camps came to the same
conclusion that the civil war had taken on a symmetrical structure, and as such,
neither was capable of achieving its aims, resolving the problem, and wining the
conflict on their own. Both parties began to feel uncomfortable in the costly dead
end zero-sum game and found themselves in a deadlock. It was thus in their best
interest to negotiate since the local conditions were becoming unendurable. This
MHS created ripeness for a negotiated resolution to take place and as a result, the
Abidjan Accords were concluded in November 1996.
The dual EO/government undertaking was a critical factor shaping the
course of Sierra Leone’s civil war since both local parties agreed to a peace accord
in 1996, following the February 1996 elections and the April 1996 ceasefire. And
in an apparent acknowledgment of EO’s effectiveness, the RUF rebels signed the
November “peace accords, which, as in Angola, mandated EO’s withdrawal as a
condition of signature”404.
The Abidjan Accords did however only generate short term temporary
peace since fighting was instigated shortly afterwards following a coup. However,
it is important to keep in mmd that EO had warned the newly elected Kabbah
government of an imminent coup and advised the government to continue
outsourcing its services405. EO anticipated a coup to take place nine months later.
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However, due to international pressure, EO was forced to depart despite upcoming
instability, a coup plot, and the military importance of clearing and holding areas.
EO was finally proven right when the coup (led by Corporal John Gborie) they had
warned the Kabbah government from did indeed occur fine months later May 25,
y 997406 This created much instability and chaos, which further sidetracked the
implementation ofthe 1996 Peace Talks.
lndeed, the Abidjan Accords did flot permanently hait the war (partly due
the security vacuum left by the EO’s rapid but involuntary departure). However,
the creation of a MHS is stiil indeed vital even if negotiations fail to lead to the
final resolution of a conflict (since MHSs create windows of opportunity for
political actors to take ajab at permanentiy resoiving civil wars). Military
operations such as EO’s are necessary for preparing the ground work and
appropriate local conditions conducive to negotiations. And EO successfully
achieved this and as a result, helped generate ripeness. Due to the non-tautological
nature of ripeness, MHS can only guarantee the initiation of negotiations. The
outcome of the negotiations is a resuit of other factors. The creation of a MHS,
which was the basis ofEO’s mandate, is vital because it is an essentiai component,
albeit not sufficient, for an enduring resolution of a conftict.
The renewal of figliting foilowing the departure of EO in the case of Sierra
Leone does not invalidate the hypothesis that EO contributed to the creation of a
MHS, hence to the creation of ripeness, resulting in the 1996 Abidjan Accords. The
foundations of an international settiement of the Sierra Leone conftict is indeed
embodied in the November 30, 1996 Abidjan accords formed between the Kabbah
government and the rebels407. Though “neyer implemented, the accords remain
valid and viable [...] Kabbah repeatedly bas indicated his readiness to implement
the accords, provided the rebels cease hostilities and recognize the legitimacy of his
Leone”, 187.
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elected government”408. Thus, EO successfully fulfihled its military, strategic and
tactical mandate and brought about a MHS.
However, since the MHS and ripe moment created by EO failed to generate
long term peace in Sierra Leone, it would be interesting for future potential
research to examine the elements which were lacldng for these accords to be
successful. Future avenues of research could focus on the variable of EO’s stay and
its possible influence. Could a permanent resolution of the conflict have transpired
if EO had stayed in Sierra Leone, prevented the coups, and halted the rebels from
taking over following the vacuum formed after EO’s departure? Having effectively
completed its military mandate, could EO have helped sustain post-MHS efforts by
cooperating with external diplomatic actors? Did EO inadvertently create
unintentional consequences in Sierra Icone, such as the rise in national politics of
new key players like the Kamajors? It is obvious that additional research on this
particular case study can add to our understanding of the multi-dimensional and
complex nature of PMFs and their impact on civil wars. Although the resuits of this
case study are flot applicable to other civil wars and cannot be generalized, they
have proven that an external third party can potentially have a significant influence
on a civil war via the creation of a MHS, hence through the contribution of
ripeness.
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CONCLUSION
Intra-state wars are often difficuit to resolve peacefully due to their
asymmetrical structure. The link between asymmetry and intractability can largely
be found in the power dynamics of a conflict. A party which is overwheÏmingly
strong bas no real incentive to negotiate with its counterpart; it would rather
escalate the conflict until the attainment of unilateral victory. The goal then
becomes the conquest and annihilation of the adversary in order to reap the benefits
of such a victory. Given that asymmetrical civil wars have very limited chances of
being resolved through negotiation, the very creation of symmetrical circumstances
should open a window of opportunity for a negotiated resolution. Stated otherwise,
symmetry can create ripe moments for negotiations.
If both parties are in a situation of parity (symmetrical structure), there is
littie hope for either of them to reach unilateral victory. Since individuals are toss
averse, the more parties bear and suffer the costs associated with the prolongation
of an un-wiiznabte war, the more likely they will reconsider halting their course of
action in favor of negotiations. Hence, a MHS is conducive to negotiations since it
helps create ripeness, a concept which “centers on the parties’ perception of a
Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past,
or recently avoided catastrophe”409.
Ripeness entails that:
when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they
cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them
(although flot necessarily in equal degree or for the same reasons), they seek
an alternative policy or Way 0ut410.
Therefore, if one can alter local conditions in order to create symmetry and hence a
MHS, the timing might then become ripe for a negotiated resolution.
409 LW. Zartman and M. Berman, The Practicat Negotiator, 66-7$.
410 1W. Zartman, “The Timing ofPeace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments”, 8.
117
The intervention of EO in Angola and Sierra Leone demonstrates that an
extemal party is capable ofarttficiaÏÏy41’ generating ripeness via the creation ofone
of its key components: Mutually Hurting Stalemates. In both cases used in this
thesis, the local governments were weak, militarily and politically, and faced an
immediate threat. Having exhausted most options available to them, they
outsourced military assistance from a private military firm named EO. In both
cases, BO managed to prop up the weaker party and create a costly situation
whereby the protagonists to the conftict found themselves in a state of rough
military power parity (symmetry; painful deadlock). A sort of equilibrium in which
neither side was getting any doser to achieving its goals had developed due to EO
who had managed to escalate and elevate the intensity of the conflicts.
After only two years of involvement in Angola, EO managed to alter the
tide of war which had until then dominated the country’s scene for over three
decades. In its two year contract between 1992 and 1994, EO contributed to the
creation of ripeness by way of generating a MHS, which resulted in the 1994
Lusaka Accords. Prior to EO’s intervention in 1992, the rebel insurgency UNifA
was disproportionately strong vis-à-vis Angola’s government and hoped to lead an
attrition war. However, the dynamics of the civil war dramatically changed just two
years later as a MHS developed. The signïficant changes witnessed in ail four
indicators contributed to a stalemate whereby Angola’s civil war took on a
symmetrical structure in 1994. Both parties had thus reached an impasse where
negotiations had become their best option. There was thus ripeness.
EO’s experience in Sierra Leone was fairly similar. After only two years in
Sierra Leone, EO had managed to generate a MHS in 1996 which subsequently led
to the 1996 November Abidjan Accords. By redressing the conflict’s symmetrical
structure, EO created a MHS and significantly contributed to the creation of
ripeness. By assisting the weak govemment of Sierra Leone, the situation had
reached a military stalemate by 1996 where neither side could win. The RUF rebel
insurgency finalÏy had to face a worthy opponent. The MHS was the sum total of
the joint impact of ail four indicators: territory, military, economy, and politics. It
‘ EO was intervening as a manipulator.
11$
had become a zero-sum game as the civil war took on a symmetrical structure.
Negotiations became a viable option since the costs associated with the war were
becoming unbearable for the two central players. With the creation of a MHS, the
moment was hence ripe for a negotiated resolution.
Yet, both Angola and Sierra Leone failed to achieve a permanent resolution
to their civil wars following EO’s intervention. Both Angola’s Lusaka Accords and
Sierra Leone’s Abidjan Talks failed to provide long term peace. This however does
not in any way negate the fact that EO successfully accomplished its military
mandates and created MHSs seeing that the Ripeness Theory is not tautological412.
Ail this information thus sheds light on the fact that EO did indeed
contribute to the creation of MHSs in Angola and Sierra Leone, and that these
MHSs created ripeness, resulting in the Peace Taiks. Due to the limited scope of
this study though, the conclusions drawn from the two case studies do incite follow
up questions that deserve future examination and ment future investigation.
Furthermore, the conclusions drawn from the two case studies at hand must flot be
generalized and might flot be valid in other cases. They are specific to the particular
circumstances and conditions dominating the political and military climate of the
two civil wars in question. Nonetheless, since it lias been proven that a PMF lias the
ability to generate ripeness, and in light of donor fatigue and a lack of international
will, the employment of PMFs should be explored and considered in similar
conflicts where other options have been exhausted.
412 Ripeness is only a condition for the initiation of negotiations. It is thus flot identical to its resuits.
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